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INTRODUCTION
Under the reserved water rights doctrine, lands the federal
government has designated for a particular purpose have rights to
sufficient water to fulfill that purpose.' Reserved water rights are also
known as Winters rights after the doctrine's foundational case, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that Congress must have
intended to reserve sufficient water to irrigate an Indian reservation
although the treaty establishing that reservation said nothing about
water.3
The federal and state governments began clashing over the proper
judicial forum for federal reserved right claims soon after the Supreme
4
Court's 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,
which extended the
Winters doctrine to include federal lands such as national monuments,
wildlife refuges, and national forests.5 In the ensuing jurisdictional
battles, the United States argued in favor of federal courts because its
claims were for federal lands and would be determined under federal
law.6 The western states, eager to maintain their traditional control
over water rights, argued that their own state
courts were the
7
appropriate forum for these controversial claims.
A 1952 federal statute known as the McCarran Amendment waived
federal sovereign immunity to state court jurisdiction in the context of
general stream adjudications,8 but provided no clear answer on where
reserved right claims should be decided.
The Supreme Court

1. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (involving the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Montana).
3. Id.
4. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
5. Id. at 601.
6. See, e.g., Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812
(1976); see also Alexander Wood, Note, Watering Down Federal CourtJurisdiction:
What Role Do Federal Courts Play in Deciding Water Rights?, 23 J. ENvrL. L. & LmG.
241, 249-50 (2008).
7. See e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1976).
8. Suits for Adjudication of Water Rights (McCarran Amendment), ch. 651, §
208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)).
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interpreted McCarran very favorably for the states, however, holding
that the policy of the statute favors state adjudications as the preferred
forum for determining reserved water rights.9 For the past thirty years
federal reserved right claims have been heard almost exclusively in state
courts, " with decidedly mixed results. (The same is true for tribal
Winters claims," but this article deals only with claims for non-Indian
federal lands.)
In 2006, however, a federal court decided a case involving reserved
water rights for Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park-and
even more remarkably, the Colorado Supreme Court earlier had
essentially decided that the federal forum was appropriate. 12 While the
most immediate result was settlement negotiations resulting in an
agreement providing stronger protection of flows for the national
park, 3 the broader implication of the Black Canyon cases is the
potential for federal court review of agency decisions affecting reserved
right claims.
This article examines the issue of federal judicial review of reserved
right settlements reached in the context of state adjudications. Part I
briefly gives the reasons why state courts typically hear federal water
right claims, and addresses some key aspects of how those courts handle
such claims. Part II tells the story of the Black Canyon controversy,
focusing on the issues surrounding federal judicial review of a partial
settlement of the park's reserved right claim. Part III analyzes the issue
of whether federal judicial review is appropriate for settlement of
reserved right claims, and concludes that review should be available
when an agency enters into a final settlement agreement. Part IV
considers the implications of federal review of reserved right
settlements, concluding that federal review would not significantly
impact reserved rights litigation, but may have significant effects on
future settlement efforts involving federal claims. The conclusion
suggests that federal judicial review may help address a couple of
9.

Colo.River, 424 U.S. at 806-08.

10. There have been only a few reserved right cases in the federal courts since the
early 1980s, focusing on tribal claims. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western
Waters:A CenturyofAdjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part11,9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.
299, 362-63 (2006). Only in New Mexico and Nevada have several adjudications been
allowed to proceed in federal court. Id. at 361. "New Mexico is unique among western
states in that the majority of its adjudications are in federal court." Id. at 351. Nevada's
federal court adjudications are old cases involving rivers which flow into the state from
California. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113-118 (1983) (describing
litigation begun in 1913 to determine water rights on the interstate Truckee River);
Mineral County v. State Dep't of Conservation and Natural Res., 20 P.3d 800, 801-805
(Nev. 2001) (describing litigation begun in 1924 to determine water rights on the
interstate Walker River).
11. SeeArizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
12. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241 (D. Colo.
2006); United States v. Colo. State Eng'r, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080 (Colo. 2004).
13. See generally Press Release, W. Res. Advocates, Water Court Finalizes Decree to
Benefit Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park (Jan. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/media/pdf/BlackCanyonDecree 1-07-09.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

fundamental problems with the way that reserved right claims have
been handled.
I. WEVNE!SAND MCCARRAN: FEDERAL CLAIMS, STATE COURTS
A. RESERVED RIGHTSJURISDICTION
For nearly half a century after its foundational case,14 the Winters
doctrine was thought to apply only to Indian Country. The great water
law scholar Frank Trelease wrote, "At no time prior to 1955 did I ever
hear a suggestion that the reserved rights doctrine was anything but a
special quirk of Indian water law." 15 In that year, the Supreme Court
decided FederalPower Commission v. Oregon, holding that the state
did not control the waters on a piece of land previously designated for a
particular purpose under federal law. 6 The Court's opinion did not.
involve a reserved rights claim or even mention Winters--the context
was hydropower dam licensing under the Federal Power Act'V-but it
dearly laid the foundation for reserved rights beyond Indian
reservations. Following that case, western members of Congress began
introducing bills to restrict the use of the8 reserved rights doctrine for
federal lands, but no such bill ever passed.'
Three years before the FederalPower Commission case, however,
Congress enacted a statute that profoundly affected all manner of
reserved right claims. The McCarran Amendment gave consent to
allow parties to join the United States as a defendant in a state court
case "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source ... where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under
State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise... . "19 Congress thus
allowed state court adjudications to determine the water rights of
federal entities along with those of all other users on a stream system.
Given that seemingly no one as of 1952 expected Winters to apply to
non-Indian federal lands, it is not surprising that McCarran's text is
utterly unclear as to whether state courts could hear reserved right
claims. But the Supreme Court held federal Winters claims
were
20
indeed subject to McCarran, finding its language "all-inclusive."
This initial decision interpreting McCarran held that reserved right
claims could be heard in state courts, but did not indicate that they
should be heard there; the statute had not eliminated federal court
14. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
15. Frank J. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473,
475 (1977).
16. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
17. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 791 (a)-828(c) (2006); Fed,Power Comm'n, 349
U.S. at 437.
18. Eva H. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of
Attempted "Clarij'ngLegislation,"20 RUTGERs L. REv. 423, 446-512 (1966).
19. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006).
20. United States v. Dist. Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
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jurisdiction over these claims. 21 In ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
District v. United States, 22 however, the Court fashioned an entirely new
doctrine of abstention applicable to water right adjudications where
reserved right claims were being litigated in federal court, but a state
court also had jurisdiction under McCarran.25
Applying this new
doctrine and weighing various factors, the Court ordered the federal
24
court to dismiss the case in favor of a later-fied action in state court.
With no language in the statute to support this result, the Court relied
on McCarran's underlying policy of avoiding "piecemeal adjudication"
of water rights. 25 The Court did not say that federal courts must always
step aside in favor of state adjudications, but hinted that they ordinarily
should, stating that McCarran "bespeaks a policy that recognizes the
availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water
rights as the means for achieving" the statute's goal of resolving
competing claims to water in a single case.26
Some might argue that the judicial forum is not crucial to the
success of reserved right claims; 27 after all, the Supreme Court has
insisted that state courts must apply federal law in determining such
claims, and that it may review state court decisions to ensure that they
do so properly. 28 But three factors suggest that the court that hears
these claims may be at least as important as the law that that court
applies. First, both the western states and the federal government
regarded the jurisdictional issue as very important, and they took steps
in the years after the McCarran Amendment to ensure that their
preferred forum heard federal water right claims. 29 Second, this
jurisdictional dispute repeatedly reached the United States Supreme
Court, which decided at least four cases on reserved right jurisdiction
from 1971 to 1983, 3 and only two cases on the substance of the Winters

21. Id. at 526.
22. Colo.River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
23. Id.at 809.
24. Id.at 818-21.
25. Id. at 819.
26. Id.
27. The Court suggested in Colorado River that the state forum should not be a
major problem even for tribal reserved right claims, insisting that "Indian interests may
be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law," and that McCarran "in no way
abridges any substantive claim on behalf of Indians under the doctrine of reserved
rights." Id.at 812-13.
28.

Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); Colo. River, 424

U.S. at 813.
29. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 331-33 (describing withdrawal of federal
government from adjudications in state courts, and state efforts to ensure that their
adjudications would satisfy McCarran Amendment requirements). "States feared that
federal and tribal water rights would be determined in federal court. Conversely,
federal and tribal attorneys feared state court determination." Id. at 333.
30. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 549; Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 803; United
States v. Dist. Ct. for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 528 (1971); United States v. Dist.
Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1971).
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doctrine in the same period."1 Third, some state adjudication decisions
have applied Winters so narrowly as to raise questions of whether state
courts always treat reserved rights claims fairly. 2 Indeed, some
commentators have stated that state courts are often "hostile" to the
federal government's reserved right claims.3 3
B. RESERVED RIGHT LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT IN STATE COURTS

Many western states are in the process of conducting water right
adjudications,' and several of these cases have been ongoing since the
1970s. 5 The prospect of federal reserved water rights was a primary
motivation for the states to launch these cases; the states sought to
ensure that their courts would hear federal and tribal claims, and
engaged in a "race to the courthouse" to achieve that goal.36 After years
of jurisdictional maneuvering and a series of victories in the Supreme
Court, the states got their wish.37 "States commenced their water
adjudications with the grim conviction that federal reserved rights did
in fact exist, a concern somewhat softened by the fact that most of these
rights would38be determined in a forum perceived to be more favorable:
state court.

Within those adjudications, the United States filed tens of
thousands of water right claims for federal and tribal lands. In Idaho's
giant Snake River Basin Adjudication, for example, the government
filed about 50,000 claims; 31 in the relatively small Klamath Basin
Adjudication,4" there were 377 federal and tribal claims. 41 This volume
31. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 131 (1976).
32. See Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine? Deny4ng Reserved
Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and Its Implications,73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 173-75
(2002); Reed D. Benson, Can't Get No Satisfaction: Securing Water for Federaland
TribalLandsin the West, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 11056, 11056-59 (2000).
33. Blumm, supra note 32, at 178 (asserting that state courts "have proved largely
hostile to reserved rights"); Eric T. Freyfogle, Repairing the Waters of the National
Parks: Notes on a Long-Term Strategy, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 815, 834 (1997)
(recommending that the National Park Service pursue strategic litigation to protect its
interests in water: "Given the hostility of many state courts to federal reserved rights,
litigation should typically occur in federal courts, in districts where judges do not have
known hostilities to either environmental protection or assertions of federal power.").
34. Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 439-42 (table providing status of adjudications
in seventeen western states).
35. Id. at 325-31 (describing commencement of adjudications in ten western states).
36. Id at 324.
37. Seeid. at 331-37.
38. Id.at 337. Only New Mexico has allowed several adjudications to play out in
federal court, based on a 1950s agreement between the federal and state governments.
Id.at 351,475.
39. According to the court conducting the adjudication, the United States filed
approximately 50,000 claims for ten federal agencies and four tribes, although some of
these claims involved rights under state law rather than reserved rights. Snake River
at
available
Brochure,
Informational
Court
Adjudication
Basin
http://www.srba.state.id.us/DOC/BROCHI.HTM (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
40. See Thorson et al., supranote 10, at 339 (noting that the Klamath case involves
only" 730 claims, far fewer than major adjudications such as Idaho's).
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of claims is not surprising, considering that nearly half of the West's
land area is in federal ownership,42 managed by agencies as diverse as
the Forest Service, Department of Defense, Fish & Wildlife Service, and
Bureau of Land Management. A 1978 federal study suggested that a
staggering 187.2 million acres in eleven western states might carry
federal or tribal reserved water rights.43 Although many reserved right
44
claims have already been resolved in the course of these adjudications,
untold thousands of claims await final disposition-some in old, but still
uncompleted, proceedings such as Arizona's Gila River Adjudication, 45
some in newer adjudications such as North Idaho's, 46 and some in river
systems where no adjudication has yet begun, such as New Mexico's
Middle Rio Grande.
Although federal law governs reserved water rights, 47 claims heard
in state courts are subject to the procedural rules of the state
adjudication proceedings. 48 Water rights adjudications are large,
complex cases, and each western state has its own approach for
conducting them; even the most concise summary of the various

41.

This number includes 313 federal reserved right claims and 64 tribal-related

claims. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, Klamath Basin Adjudication Claim and Contest
at
available
2009,
19,
May
of
as
Information
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/klamathadj/Status of the.Adjudication.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
42. "The percentage of federally owned land (excluding Indian reservations and
other trust properties) in the Western States ranges from 29.5% of the land in the State
of Washington to 86.5% of the land in the State of Nevada, an average of about 46%."
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).
43. The eleven states were Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. According to the report, each
of these states could have over 10 million acres of land carrying reserved water rights,
ranging from 10.8 million acres in Washington to 28.2 million acres in California.
supra note 10, at 310-11.
Thorson, et al.,
44. According to the State of Oregon, all 313 federal reserved right claims in the
Klamath Adjudication have been resolved, although most of the tribal claims are still
being contested. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, supa note 41.
45. See Michael K. Jeanes, The Water Case Turns 30,MARIcOPA LAWYER, May 2009,
at
available
3,
at
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/Adjudications/-pdfs/MLMayO
9.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (describing the 30-year history of Gila River
adjudication, and noting that several federal reserved right claims remain unresolved).
46. 'See Press Release, Idaho Dep't of Water Res., IDWR Commences Northern
at
available
2009),
8,
(Jan.
Adjudication
Idaho
(last
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/News/news-releases/rels2009/Oljan/2009-O2.pdf
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
47. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) (holding that
federal courts in Arizona and Montana should abstain from hearing tribal reserved right
claims in favor of state adjudications, but stating "[wle also emphasize, as we did in
ColoradoRiver, that our decision in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian
rights in state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much as federal
courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law."). See also Colo. River
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); United States v. Dist. Ct.
of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
48. United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 508 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1993).
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adjudication procedures would require many pages.4 9 For purposes of
this article, however, two aspects of state adjudications are relevant.
First, once the government (or any other party) files a water right claim,
other parties to the adjudication have the opportunity to object to that
claim. ° The objection may deny that the claimed right is valid at all, or
may challenge the claimed priority date, purpose of use, quantity of
water, or other aspects of the right as claimed.5 1 A single claim may
generate a large number of objections,52 particularly if it is a reserved
right claim.53
Second, state adjudications commonly are not open to every citizen
or group that would like to participate. Unless persons claim or assert
water rights in the adjudication,5 4 they become parties to the case by
objecting to one or more rights claimed by others;5 5 however, many
state adjudication statutes allow only water users to file objections5 In
other states, persons or groups without water rights may participate in
the adjudication, but often find themselves effectively foreclosed from
raising key issues of concern to them.5 7 Thus, entities that are interested
in the river but do not claim water rights-such as environmental,
rafting, and angling groups-are typically either unable to participate in
the adjudication, or foreclosed from raising key issues of concern to
them.
In the end, reserved right claims are often resolved through
negotiated agreements, and these settlements are regarded as a positive
outcome of state water adjudications. 8 Nearly all of the focus on
49. Fortunately, an excellent summary of adjudication procedures exists in a lengthy
article by four experts on western water adjudications. Thorson et al., supm note 10, at
356-432.
50. Id.at 393.
51.

Id.

52. In Oregon's Klamath Basin Adjudication, for example, various parties filed a
total of 5,664 contests (objections) to 730 claims. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, supra note
41.
53. In the Klamath Adjudication, 313 federal reserved right claims produced 4,355
contests. By contrast, 300 claims for private rights yielded 969 contests. Id.

54. For a general explanation of who may claim water rights and how claims are
handled, see Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 384-86.
55. Id. at 392-396 (providing a general explanation of objections and how objectors
become parties).
56. Id. at 393, nn.677-80 (citing sixteen state statutes).

57. In Colorado, for example, although "any person" may object to a filed claim, the
Colorado Supreme Court has held that in the absence of statutory authority to do so, a
water court may not deny an application based on environmental factors. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (b) (2005); In re Bd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 971-73
(Colo. 1995) (rejecting appeal by environmental groups as contrary to Colorado water
law, while acknowledging that "environmental factors might provide a reasonable and
sound basis for altering existing law."). Similarly, in Washington, any interested party
may file objections. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.200 (2009). However, according to the
Washington Supreme Court, environmental and other public interest factors "cannot
operate to impair existing water rights" being determined in an adjudication. State
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993).

58.

"The successful completion of reserved water rights settlements is probably the
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reserved right settlements, however, has involved tribal Wmters claims.
The western states, for example, have a longstanding policy resolution
favoring settlement of tribal claims,59 but no similar policy regarding
settlement of non-tribal federal reserved rights. The literature on
reserved right settlements is quite rich as to tribal rights,' and rather
thin as to federal rights.6 Despite the relative lack of information, it
seems clear that federal reserved right claims often settle,62 and those
settlement agreements often protect existing users from any harm that
could otherwise result from recognition of the reserved right.6" Once
brightest achievement associated with western stream adjudications." Thorson et al.,
supranote 10, at 444.
59. W. GovERNoRs' ASS'N, PoucY RESOLUTION 07-3, NEGOTIATED INDIAN WATER
at
available
(2007),
SETTLEMENTS
RIGHTS

http://www.westgov.org/index.php?option=comjoomdoc&task=doc-download&gid=6
56&Itemid= (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (indicating that the policy dates back to 1987
(Resolution 87-007), and has been readopted six times by the Western Governors
Association).
60. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAx ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 865 n2 ( 3rd
ed. 2000) (listing numerous sources); BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST (2005) (providing a general

overview of tribal water rights negotiation); Nez Perce Water Rights SettlementArticles,
42 IDAHO L. REv. 547, 547-794 (2006) (consisting of seven articles that present various
perspectives on the Nez Perce tribal water rights settlement).
61. Perhaps the most detailed explanation of settlement of non-tribal federal
Winters claims is all of eleven pages long. David Amman et al., Negotiation of the
Montana-NationalPark Service Compact, 5 RIVERS 35, 35-45 (1995) (explaining the
State of Montana's successful negotiation with the National Park Service regarding
reserved rights for Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks). A comprehensive review of
western stream adjudications noted that "[s]ettlements have played a large role in
determining federal reserved rights in the west," but went on to discuss only tribal
settlements. Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 407-09..
62.' As stated in the 2000 edition of a leading water law text, "Although litigation
goes forward on many fronts, a trend toward settlement of non-Indian federal reserved
rights claims is emerging." SAx, supra note 60, at 814. In Montana's massive
adjudication, for example, all but a few of the many non-tribal reserved right claims
have been resolved through negotiations, and none of these claims have been litigated.
E-mails from Susan Cottingham, Program Manager for the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, to Reed D. Benson, Professor, University of New Mexico
School of Law (Aug. 10-11, 2009) (on file with author). Montana's numerous compacts
involving water rights, including reserved rights, are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 8520-101 to -1601 (2009).
63. Water users (and states) often oppose reserved rights because these rights may
be legally senior to existing water uses established after the date of the federal
reservation-meaning that in times of drought, these established uses may fail in favor
of the federal right. To prevent this result, settlements may effectively subordinate the
reserved water right to existing uses, perhaps by assigning it a priority date that junior to
the date of the reservation. "The United States agrees to subordinate its federal
reserved rights to at least some appropriations initiated after the federal reservation, in
return for which the state agrees to cap further appropriations and to manage
groundwater outside the boundaries of the federal reservation to protect wetlands and
other water-dependent resources inside the reservation." SAX, supra note 60, at 815.
See also Press Release, Dep't. of Justice, Historic Water Rights Settlement Reached in
at
available
2000)
15,
(Mar.
Colorado
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/129enrd.htm (describing a settlement of
Forest Service reserved right claims in southern Colorado, whereby the Forest Service
"relinquishes its claimed early priority dates to water and accepts a 1999 priority date");
W. WATER PoLIcY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR
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the parties agree on settlement of a reserved64 right claim, the
adjudicating court must still approve the agreement.
Reserved right settlements are often touted because they resolve
water right controversies by mutual agreement and eliminate the need
for years of expensive litigation.65 This kind of praise was heaped on a
2003 agreement between the Interior Department and the State of
Colorado regarding water rights for Black Canyon of the Gunnison
National Park. 66
However, that agreement generated its own
controversy and litigation, with remarkable results.
II. THE BLACK CANYON RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY
A. THE BLACK CANYON AND ITS RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

The Black Canyon of the Gunnison is a spectacular gorge in central
Colorado, carved deep into rugged hills and high desert by the
Gunnison River. The gorge's dimensions are dramatic-it is up to
2722 feet deep, as little as 1100 feet wide at the rim, and as narrow as
forty feet at the river 67 -but those numbers only hint at the awesome
grandeur of the Black Canyon.
Far below the gorge rim flows the Gunnison River, named for
Captain John Williams Gunnison, whose 1853 expedition provided the
first written description of the Black Canyon.
The river today,
however, looks very different than the one Captain Gunnison saw, as
described by the National Park Service: 'The Gunnison River no longer
flows freely through canyon. Three dams hold back its seasonal flood,
reducing its former glory to a feeble shadow. Yet even in its diminished
state, the Gunnison continues to add to the geologic story of Black
Canyon ... drop by precious drop."6 9 Even in its diminished state, the
THE NEXT

CENTURY4-13 (1998) (describing a settlement of reserved water rights for Zion
National Park in Utah, which "allows valid existing uses to continue"); In re Water
Rights for the United States of America, No. 01CW05at 11 (Colo. Water Div. 4, Jan. 8,
2009) (outlining the final settlement for subordination to certain existing, junior uses);
A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 923-28 (2009) (illustrating that
subordination provisions are fairly standard features of tribal reserved rights
settlements. The authors noted that in settlements, tribes' "senior claims under Winters
are commonly subordinated to existing (and sometimes future) non-Indian uses").
64. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 408-11 (describing approval criteria and
procedures employed by courts in Arizona, New Mexico, and Montana adjudications).
65. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 63(quoting a water user representative as
being "pleased that this long controversy can have such a positive conclusion," and

noting that the settlement will save all parties millions in litigation costs).
66. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park - Black
Canyon
Dimensions,
available
at
http://www.nps.gov/blca/naturescience/dimension.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
68. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park Explorers:
1853
Gunnison
Expedition,
available
at

http://www.nps.gov/blca/historyculture/explorer-gunnison.htm
2010).
69.

(last visited Feb. 20,

U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park - From
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river has outstanding recreational values. The Gunnison through Black
Canyon National Park is designated as a Gold-Medal Trout Stream by
the State of Colorado, and the gorge section of the river offers expert
kayakers Class V rapids and incredible scenery.70
In 1933, President Hoover signed a proclamation establishing Black
This brief
Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument.7 1
proclamation noted that it would serve the public interest to preserve
"the spectacular gorges and additional features of scenic, scientific, and
educational interest." 72 It directed the National Park Service to manage
the Black Canyon under the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,
with its charge to preserve natural resources and provide public access
in the parks "in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.77
Congress upgraded the Black Canyon to a national park in 1999. In
enacting the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park and
Gunnison Gorge National Conservation Area Act, Congress made
numerous findings regarding the many uses and values of the Black
Canyon and surrounding lands, but said little about the Gunnison
River. 74 The National Park Service retained authority to manage the75
new park under the

1999 statute and the 1916 Organic

Act.

Regarding water rights, Congress declared that the statute did not affect
any existing water rights (including those held by the United States)
and did not constitute an express or implied reservation of water for the
preserving the status quo regarding Black Canyon water
park, effectively
76
rights.

Long before Congress established the national park, however, the
United States had secured a partially defined water right for the Black
Canyon. In 1978, a Colorado water court entered a decree confirming
the existence, priority date, and purposes of a reserved water right for
the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument. 77 As stated in
the decree, the purpose of the monument "is to conserve and maintain
in an unimpaired condition the scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic

Past to Present, availableat http://www.nps.gov/blca/naturescience/pasttopresent.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
70. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park Fishing, available at http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/fishing.htm

(last visited

Feb. 20, 2010); U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park
-

Kayaking, available at http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/kayaking.htm

(last

visited Feb. 20, 2010); see U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison
Scenic
Drives,
available
at
National
Park
http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/drives.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
71. Proclamation No. 2032, 47 Stat. 2558 (Mar. 2, 1933).
72. Id.
73. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
74. See Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park and Gunnison Gorge National
Conservation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 106-76, 113 Stat. 1126 (1999).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
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objects of the monument, as well as the wildlife therein, in order that
the monument might provide a source of recreation and enjoyment for
all generations of citizens of the United States."08 Thus, the court
decreed a water right for certain purposes, including both recreation
and conservation as well as preservation of scenic and aesthetic values.
The decree specifically authorized minimum stream flows in the
Gunnison River for fish conservation and to "[a]ttain and preserve the
recreational, scenic, and aesthetic conditions existing" as of the
monument's creation. 79 The priority date was March 2, 1933, the date
President Hoover signed the proclamation designating the
monument.8 0
The 1978 decree thus recognized a Black Canyon reserved right,
but explicitly did not quantify it. The court labeled the decree
"interlocutory," and addressed numerous federal water right claims in
addition to the Black Canyon right.8 1 The decree stated, "The waters
granted herein in fulfillment of the reserved rights of the United States
shall be quantified pursuant to this decree," and it did not award the
government "exclusive tide to any absolute or relative volume of
water..." 8 2 It did, however, "determine all of the reserved rights of the
United States" for certain categories of federal lands in western
Colorado, and "establish the priority of the United States' right to use
water" under its reserved water rights, including the one for Black
Canyon National Monument."
The 1978 decree required the United States to file an application to
quantify the Black Canyon reserved right, which would claim specific
flows for each week of the year and explain why these flows were
necessary to support the purposes of the national monument. 84 Once
the court determined the amounts needed for the Black Canyon, they
would "be the subject of an absolute water right with a priority date as
of the reservation date" of the monument.8 5 The decree required the
government to apply for quantification within five years. 86
Nearly twenty-three years later, the United States finally sought to
quantify the Black Canyon reserved right. On January 17, 2001-in the
final week of the Clinton Administration-the Justice Department filed
papers in the Colorado water court claiming certain flows in the river

78. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (Mar. 6, 1978 Interlocutory Decree Entered).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2, 4-5
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (June 17, 2008 Review Draft).
82. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
83. Id.
84. See In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 1,
Attachment B (Colo. Water Div, 4) (2001).
85. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (Mar. 6, 1978 Interlocutory Decree Entered).
86. Id.
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through Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park. 7
The
application did not explain why it was filed nearly two decades late, but
in later filings the government stated that the National Park Service
performed extensive scientific studies and modeling to determine the
necessary flow levels. 88
The federal application claimed instream flows of two primary types:
"base flows" and "peak flows." 89 The minimum claimed base flow, to be
met throughout the year, was 300 cfs. 90 The application sought variable
base flows for the May 1-July 25 period, to be determined by the amount
of water predicted to flow into a specified reservoir above the Black
Canyon; base flows for this period would be lower in drier years and
higher in wetter ones, but would never exceed 3350 cfs. 91 The claimed
peak flow would be met one day per year during the May I-June 30
period. 92 Like the base flow claim, this one-day high flow would vary
depending on the forecasted inflow for the year.93 The application also
claimed certain flow levels, known as "shoulder flows," to be met as
Gunnison River levels rose to and fell from the annual oneday peak.94
By claiming flows for the protection of the park, however, the
application threatened to constrain operation of the Aspinall Unit, a
federal project operated by the Bureau of Reclamation ("USBR") just
upstream of the Black Canyon.9 5 A major element of the Colorado
River Storage Project, the Aspinall Unit comprises three dams with a
combined storage capacity exceeding one million acre-feet; Blue Mesa
dam, completed in 1966, forms the largest reservoir in Colorado. 96 In
addition to storing water for irrigation and other purposes, these dams
provide flood control and generate hydropower that is marketed
through the Western Area Power Administration ("VAPA").9' Congress

authorized the Aspinall (originally "Curecanti") Unit of the Colorado
River Storage Project in 1956 along with other major facilities such as
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado, Navajo Dam on the San Juan, and
Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green.98 Water rights for the Aspinall Unit
87. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 1
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
88. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants'
Dispositive Motion at 20-21, High Country Citizens' -Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d
1235 (D. Colo.2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712).
89. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2-3
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (June 17, 2008 Review Draft).
90. Id.at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supranote 88, at 1.
96. Id. at 2, 7.
97. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project: Aspinall Unit,
availableat http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/aspinall/index.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2010); see Colorado River Storage Project Management Center, available at
http://www.wapa.gov/crsp/aboutcrsp/default.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
98. Act of Apr. 11, 1956, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
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Home

Page,

available
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have a priority date of November 13, 1957.90
The application acknowledged that exercising the claimed rights to
peak flows in the Black Canyon would "require careful consideration of
numerous factors, including the structural capacity of upstream dams
and potential downstream flooding, among other river management
issues."'0 0 It concluded by stating that the Secretary of the Interior
would "confer" with the State of Colorado, the National Park Service,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Western Area Power Administration,
"and other affected interests in order to ensure that operational
decisions to exercise this right are in accord with the best available
information and with full consideration of the river management issues
noted."'0 ' USBR and WAPA thus got a voice in shaping peak flows for
the park, but the application gave no indication that the Black Canyon's
water rights could be effectively subordinated to upstream storage and
hydropower generation at the Aspinall Unit.
Controversy soon
followed.
B. CUTTING THE CLAIM: A PARTIAL FEDERAL-STATE SETTLEMENT

This effort to quantify the Black Canyon instream flow claims
predictably raised serious and widespread objections. More than 380
entities filed papers in Colorado water court opposing the federal
claims; virtually all of these opposers claimed that the application
sought more water than the park needed."0 2 Others argued that the
claimed flows were inconsistent with federal duties to operate the
Aspinall Unit under the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act, or
even that the statute had implicitly modified the Black Canyon's
reserved right. ' ° The government later stated that these and other
arguments showed the risk it faced in litigating the park's instream flow
claim in the Colorado water court.'0 4
If Colorado state officials and water users were upset with the
federal quantification filing in the final week of the Clinton
Administration, they were surely cheered by President Bush's
appointment of former Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton as
Secretary of the Interior.1 0 5 Bennett Raley, a prominent Colorado water
lawyer, became the new Assistant Secretary for Water and Science
(overseeing the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Geological

http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, supra note 97.
99. See In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W437, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 3.
102. See Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 28.
103. Seeid. at28-29.
104. Id. at 28.
105. David E. Sanger, The 43d President: The Transition; New Picks Firm up
Conservative Cast of Bush's Cabine4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/30/43rd-president-transition-new-picks-firm-upconservative-cast-bush-s-cabinet.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).

Issue 2

BLACK CANYON

David Bernhardt was yet another high-level Interior
Survey).' 0 6
Department official from Colorado' 7 who would play a key role
regarding Black Canyon water rights.10 8
The 2001 quantification claim also raised concerns within the
federal government; USBR and WAPA certainly stood to lose if Black
Canyon instream flows were quantified at or near the levels claimed.
Representatives of these two agencies, the National Park Service, and
other units of the Interior Department began meeting to discuss a
compromise that would protect both the park and the Aspinall Unit.
An internal Park Service memo summarizing these discussions shows
that the various agency negotiating positions were rather far apart,
agreeing only on a minimum flow of 300 cfs.' 9 The Park Service
proposed peak flows of 10,000 to 16,000 cfs, "lower peak flows" of up to
10,000 cfs, and "shoulder flows" of up to 3,200 cfs.' 10 USBR offered
peak flows of 10,000 cfs "infrequently," "lower peak flows" of up to 5,500
cfs, and "shoulder flows" of up to 1,200 cfs." l The WAPA position
allowed for peak flows of 10,000 to 13,000 cfs, but it called for faster
ramping rates (river level increases or decreases) than the Park Service
wanted, did not mention
"lower peak flows," and made no provision for
"shoulder flows." 1 1 2
Further negotiations within the Interior
modeling runs
Department sought to close this gap, informed by USBR
13
of various operational scenarios for the Aspinall Unit.
In April 2003, the Interior Department signed an agreement with
114
the State of Colorado regarding Black Canyon instream flow rights.
The agreement sharply reduced the reserved right claim, leaving only a
300 cfs minimum flow right with a 1933 priority date."' Additional

106. Katherine Q. Seelye, Bush is Choosing Industry Insiders to Fill Several
Environmental Positions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2001, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/1 2/us/bush-is-choosing-industry-insiders-to-fillseveral-environmental-positions.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
at
Office
of
the
Solicitor
Homepage,
available
107. See
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/bernhardt-bio.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (noting
that Bernhardt is a Rifle, Colorado native who has held various senior positions within
the Department of the Interior).
108. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher J. Treese, External Affairs Manager, Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist., to David Bernhardt, Dep't of Interior (June 17, 2003)
(Administrative Record at 6541, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp.
2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006)) (thanking Bernhardt for his "efforts ...to honor state water
law and protect historical water users in the Gunnison basin")).
109. Memorandum (apparently from Nat'l Park Serv. staff to Nat'l Park Serv. Dir.
Fran Mainella) on Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park-Federal Reserved
Water Right (Feb. 8, 2002) (Administrative Record at 12784, High Country Citizens'
Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1235).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Seeid.
114. Agreement, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park, Signed by Officials of
the U.S. Dep't of the Interior and the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. (Apr. 2, 2003)
(Administrative Record at 6401, High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at
1235).
115. Id.
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flows for the park would rely upon a minimum flow right under
Colorado state law, to be held by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board (CWCB), with a 2003 priority date.' 16 The agreement did not
define specific instream flows for the Black Canyon above 300 cfs;
instead, it included a table of flows that "can be reasonably expected,
based on historical averages of the last twenty-six years, to pass through
the Aspinall Unit" for the benefit of the park.1 7 The table showed a
300 cfs base flow available every year, and "shoulder flows" of 300-1000
cfs available in twenty-two out of twenty-six years." 8 Expected peak
flows ranged from a low of 2000-5000 cfs available in eight out of
twenty-six years, to a high of 10,000+ cfs available in three out of twentysix years.' 9 The agreement clearly stated, however, that these flows
were not guaranteed in the future,
and that the quantity of water would
12
depend on a range of factors.
Other than cutting the reserved right claim to 300 cfs, the
agreement did not quantify water rights for the Black Canyon; instead,
it described the operational priorities and procedures of the Aspinall
Unit, which
in turn would dictate the amount of water available for the
1
park.

12

Other than the 300 cfs minimum flow, nothing in the agreement
imposed any substantive limits or requirements on Aspinall Unit
operations; park flows were stated only as "reasonably expected" values
with no guarantees, and there was no mention of ramping rates, which
had been a key element of the 2001 claim and the subsequent
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. "Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The agreement stated the following regarding Aspinall Unit operations and
Black Canyon flows:
[T]he ultimate amount of water that will be available [for the park] in the
future is dependent upon many factors, including where the water is removed
from the system, the hydrology and the timing of the hydrology, future project
demand, and reservoir elevation at the beginning of the run-off season. In
light of these considerations, on an annual basis and prior to the spring runoff, the Bureau of Reclamation shall consult with the National Park Service,
the Western Area Power Administration, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, the CWCB, the Colorado Water River Water Conservation District, the
Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Association, the Upper Gunnison Water
Conservancy District, the City and County of Delta, and Redlands Water and
Power Company, on Aspinall Unit project operations for the upcoming season
regarding the delivery of the CWCB right. Nothing in the consultation
process will divest the Bureau of Reclamation of its obligation to operate the
Aspinall Unit in furtherance of its authorized purposes and obligations, and
the Bureau of Reclamation shall operate the Aspinall Unit consistently with
*the terms of this agreement.... The Bureau of Reclamation will deliver the
flows of the Gunnison River in accordance with the CWCB instream flow right
with the 2003 priority date described [above], to the extent that such flows
have not been appropriated by senior water right holders under Colorado law,
to the extent that such flows are not subject to appropriation by the Aspinall
Unit under the authorized purposes, and to the extent that such flows do not
impair the structural integrity of the Aspinall Unit.
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interagency negotiations.'22 The mention of "future project demand" as
a factor in determining flows for the park indicated that new offstream
water uses could reduce the amount of water available, leaving the
Black Canyon with even less protection than a 2003 water right might
otherwise indicate.
The April 2003 agreement called for USBR, the National Park
Service, and the State of Colorado to create "a binding Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) ... regarding enforcement and protection of the

instream flow right" to be held by the CWCB. 123 Under the ensuing
MOA of July 31, 2003, the CWCB agreed to act under state law as
24
needed to exercise and protect the instream flow right for the park. 1
The earlier agreement stated that the Park Service would be able to
enforce the instream flow right if the CWCB failed to do so, but the
MOA said only that the United States or the CWCB could sue (in an
unspecified court) to enforce the MOA. 125 The agreement capped peak
flows through the Black Canyon at 10,000 cfs, and specified that
exercise of the instream flow right "shall not interfere
with the
126
operations or authorized purposes of the Aspinall Unit."
Neither the federal government nor the State of Colorado has said
much about the events leading up to the April 2003 agreement, so
there is little public information on how it was developed or who
participated in negotiating it. Notes of a November 2002 "Black
Canyon mtg" show only that ten federal and seven state agency officials
were in attendance. 127 A CWCB staff report in May 2003 said only that
the staff "continues to serve as part of Colorado's negotiating team
working with other Colorado water users and a number of federal
agencies towards the quantification" of the Black Canyon reserved
right,
1 28
without identifying these users or their role in the process.
Federal and state officials hailed the 2003 agreements as a
breakthrough on the Gunnison dispute and a model for resolving
conflicts over water rights for federal lands. Interior Secretary, Gale
Norton, praised the deal as an innovative, collaborative solution to
competing demands for water.12 9
After saying that the 2001
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6402.
124. Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Department of the
Interior National Park Service and Bureau of Reclamation and the Colorado Water
Conservation Board Concerning the Enforcement and Protection of Water and Water
Rights (July 31, 2003) (Administrative Record at 12666, High Country Citizens'
Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1235).
125. Agreement, supra note 114, at 6402; Memorandum of Agreement, supra note
123, at 12669.
126. Id. at 12669.
127. Attendance Sign-In Sheet, Black Canyon Meeting (Nov. 22, 2002)
(Administrative Record at 11983, High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at

1235).
128. Memorandum from Rod Kuharich and Dan McAuliffe to Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. Members 17 (May 8, 2003) (on file with author).
129. Gale A. Norton, Op-Ed., A New Path for Western Water Issues, DENVER POST,
Apr. 20, 2003, at E-04.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 13

quantification application claimed "far more water than the park has
received in recent memory or will ever need," she stated that the Park
Service and USBR first reached agreement among themselves, then
found a way to protect park needs in cooperation with the state.
A key innovation is using a state "instream flow" right to protect the
park, which avoids the turf battle that sometimes blocks settlements.
The Park Service knows it will get the amount of water necessary to
protect the park. Reclamation knows how to manage its water facilities.
Local communities and citizens know their water rights are secure.
The certainty provided by this agreement will help both the local
economy and natural resource conservation, since both function better
when everyone understands exactly what their water rights are.13
The director of Colorado's Department of Natural Resources said
the agreement would bring "a new era of cooperation with the federal
government that results in real environmental benefits." 131 A State of

Colorado press release said that the original federal claim "could have
permanently imposed drought-like conditions in the Gunnison River
Basin. " 132 Similarly, a major water supplier on Colorado's Western
Slope said the agreement "is being welcomed as a major step
forward. "133
Environmental groups, however, blasted the agreement as a
giveaway that would harm the Black Canyon and set a bad precedent.
Trout Unlimited complained that trading a federal water right with a
1933 priority for a state right with a 2003 priority was a bad deal and
would open the door to more water being diverted out of the Gunnison
upstream of the park.3 3 A Trout Unlimited staff attorney said that the
'deal "cuts the heart out of the park. Our concern is that the Interior
Department will use this as a model to further dewater our National
135
Parks, our National Forests, and our National Wildlife Refuges."
The agreements of April and July 2003 reduced the Black Canyon
claims but did not fully settle them. The Colorado water court in
Montrose still needed to quantify the park water rights, so it scheduled
an eight-week trial on the matter beginning September 2004.136 The
environmental groups had to know, however, that in the Colorado
courts they had no real chance of getting a better result than these
130.

Id.

131.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Department Announces Major

Agreement for Gunnison River Water in Colo. (Apr. 2, 2003) available at
http://www.interior.gov/news/03_NewsReleases/030402.htm
(last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
132. Press Release, State of Colo., State, Federal Officials to Announce Historic
Settlement Agreement on Black Canyon of the Gunnison Water Rights (Apr. 1, 2003).
133. Letter from R. Eric Kuhn, General Manager, Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist., to Greg Walcher, Executive Dir., Colo. Dep't of Natural Res. (Apr. 10, 2003).
134. Press Release, Trout Unlimited, Trout Unlimited Condemns Bush
Administration's Decision to "Give Away" the Gunnison River (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file
with author).
135. Id.
136. See Order on Motion for Stay at 1, Concerning the Application for Water Rights
of the United States, No. O1CW05 (Colo. Water Div. 4, Oct. 7, 2003).
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agreements would provide. For one thing, environmental groups had
traditionally gotten little traction in the water courts, largely because
Colorado water law does not allow water judges to consider
environmental factors in determining water rights. 3 And while the
Black Canyon rights would be determined under federal rather than
state law, the environmental groups would be arguing for more water
under the 1933 reserved right than the claimant federal government
would be, placing them in a unique and nearly impossible position.
Realistically, it could only get worse in the water court; if the
environmental groups wanted a better deal for the Black Canyon, they
needed a different forum. Thus, they sued to challenge the Interior
Department's action in federal court 3' and sought to put the water
court proceedings on hold.
C. STAYING THE WATER COURT LITIGATION

When the government reached the April 2003 agreement with the
State of Colorado, it filed a motion in the Colorado water court to
amend its quantification application, 139 cutting its claim to 300 cfs. But,
the Black Canyon reserved right would not be final until the water court
issued a decree following further proceedings. Environmental groups
were pinning their hopes on the federal court to overturn the 2003
agreements, but they recognized that a final water court decree of the
park reserved right would effectively moot their federal claims.' 40 Thus,
in September 2003, they moved to stay the water court proceedings
pending resolution
(including consideration of the motion to amend)
4
of the issues raised in the newly filed federal case.1 '
The motion for stay placed the water court in an unfamiliar
position. For nearly thirty years, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Colorado River Water Conservation Distict, 1 42 federal courts had
generally abstained from cases involving reserved right claims in favor
of state court adjudications. While a deferral by the water court
certainly would not conflict with the Colorado River case, it would
depart from the conventional wisdom that federal courts no longer
have a role in reserved rights litigation.
Colorado agencies and water users opposed the motion for stay on
that basis, arguing that the water court was the proper forum for
quantification of the Black Canyon rights and that it would relinquish
its authority by staying proceedings. 43 The United States did not raise

137. In reBd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995).
138. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (D.
Colo. 2006).
139. Id.
140. See Order on Motion, supranote 136.
141. SeeId.
142. See generallyColo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81920 (1976) (avoiding "piecemeal" adjudication favors deferring to state court
proceedings).
143.

Order on Motion for Stay at 1, supra note 136, at 1.
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these arguments but did oppose the stay, contending that the
environmental groups had not adequately shown a need for it and that
delaying the state proceedings would harm other parties.1"
The
environmental groups maintained that the stay was needed because a
water court quantification decree would make the Black Canyon
reserved rights final, thus preventing any effective relief on their federal
claims; the Colorado agencies and water users countered that the only
proper federal forum was United States Supreme Court review of a final
quantification decree from the Colorado courts.'4 5
After weighing these arguments and others, the water court granted
the motion for stay, exercising its discretion to hold the quantification
proceedings, pending resolution of the federal litigation. 4 6
It
concluded that refusing the stay would prejudice the environmental
groups because a final reserved right decree would be res judicata,
leaving them "without adequate recourse" if they were to win their
federal case.'47 The water court seemed to discount any potential harm
from delaying its proceedings, noting that the quantification
application was filed in 2001 but that the reserved rights themselves
were much older; it did not mention the twenty-three-year delay
preceding that application. The court insisted that it was merely staying
proceedings on the Black Canyon water rights, not deferring to the
federal court on quantification.' 4 8
The Colorado agencies and water users petitioned the Colorado
Supreme Court to overturn the stay, arguing that the water court had
abused its discretion.' 49 The core of their arguments was that all issues
relating to park water rights belonged in the water court under the
McCarran Amendment as applied by Colorado River, and that the
federal case would usurp the water court's role by effectively
determining the minimum amount of the reserved right.50 They
contended that the stay had allowed the environmental groups "to
effectively shift forums for certain key aspects of the quantification
proceeding in contravention of... the clear federal policy of deference
to state court adjudication of reserved rights claims," and resulted "in
an effective abdication of [water court] jurisdiction over a critical
component of the Black Canyon reserved right adjudication." 5 ' The
environmental groups maintained their position that the federal case
was different from the quantification proceeding and therefore not an
infringement on the water court's jurisdiction, and that the stay was

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
Rights
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 2-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Reply to Petition Pursuant to C.AR. 21 at 1, 7, 11-12, In re Application for Water
of the U.S., 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004) (No. 03SA321).
Id. at 2-4, 7, 12.
Id. at 7.
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needed to avoid prejudice from a final decree.' 52 For its part, the
United States evidently dropped its opposition to the stay once the
53
court issued it.'
A divided Colorado Supreme Court upheld the stay in In re The
Application for Water Rights of the United States of America, finding
no abuse of the water court's discretion. 154 After examining the
McCarran Amendment, the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and cases applying these statutes, the
court concluded that McCarran's waiver of sovereign immunity is "not
so broad that it allows state courts to evaluate or adjudicate the federal
agency decision making processes leading the United States to make a
The Environmental
particular water application in a given case.
Opposers have brought claims in federal court that can only be decided
by that court."155
Because of the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over these
claims, the only question was whether the stay was an abuse of
discretion.15 6 The court found that the balance of hardships tipped in
favor of the stay because the federal plaintiffs faced the threat of res
judicata from a water court decree, whereas the other parties would
suffer no great harm from further delay of a case that was already
almost three decades old. 15'
Most significantly, the Colorado Supreme Court flatly rejected the
argument that the stay was improper in light of federal and state cases
applying McCarran:
The water court explicitly retained its jurisdiction to quantify the
United States' reserved water right. The fact that the federal case may
decide that the United States violated federal law when it reduced its
water right claim does not amount to a quantification of the water
right.... Because of the exclusivity of the federal court's jurisdiction
over the federal claims, dual proceedings are necessary and the
McCarran Amendment's policy to avoid piecemeal litigation is
inapplicable. As stated above, resolution of the federal case may
but it will not
influence the parameters of the water court's decision,
158
quantify the United States' reserved water right.
Justice Hobbs dissented, joined by Justice Kourlis1 59 Taking a very
expansive view of McCarran Amendment text and caselaw, the dissent
took issue with both aspects of the majority opinion. First, Justice

152. Answer to Rule to Show Cause 1-2, In re Application for Water Rights of the
United States, 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004).
153. See Reply to Petition Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, supra note 149, at 10 n.7 (stating
that the U.S. initially opposed the stay but "now does not consider it to rise to the level
of an abuse of discretion").
154. In re Application for WaterRights of the United States, 101 P.3d at 1075.
155. Id. at 1080.
156. Id.
157. 1d, at 1083.
158. Id, at 1083-84.
159. Id. at 1084 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
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Hobbs rejected exclusive federal jurisdiction of the federal claims,
arguing that McCarran "expressly provides for the state court to decide
all factual and legal issues affecting the quantification and
administration of the right, which the plaintiffs' claims in federal court
surely do." 6 ° Second, he argued that the federal case would indeed
infringe on water court jurisdiction, because deciding the legality of the
2003 agreements was not so different from quantifying the reserved
right.' 6' "Such a neat distinction does not accord with the interrelated
factual and legal issues in such a case as this, and, I conclude, derogates
the long history of the Colorado courts' role in McCarran
adjudications."'6 2
Thus, the stay remained, leaving the United States District Court to
determine the environmental groups' federal claims. They would wait
nearly two years for a decision on the merits, but they would find it
worth the wait.
D. MAKING A FEDERAL CASE OF THE 2003 AGREEMENTS
In September 2003, a coalition of local and national
environmental/conservation groups sued the Interior Department and
Secretary Gale Norton in U.S. District Court in Denver, alleging that the
agreements violated various federal laws by relinquishing the reserved
right necessary to protect the park. 6 3 Under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),' 64 plaintiffs sought an order setting aside the
2003 agreements and remanding the matter of the Black Canyon water
rights back to the Department of the Interior. 165 High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton was assigned to Judge Clarence Brimmer of

the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by
166
-designation.
The lawsuit framed the agreements as giving up a 1933
(unquantified) reserved right adequate to protect the park in favor of a
junior water right held by the CWCB. Plaintiffs argued that this action
violated the law by essentially delegating the federal government's duty
to protect the park to a state agency, and by disposing of federal
167
property (the reserved right) without Congressional authorization.
The plaintiffs contended that the agreements provided too little water
to protect the Black Canyon environment, and therefore violated both
the Park Service Organic Act 168 and the 1999 statute creating the

160.

Id. at 1086.

161.

Id. at 1088.

162. Id.
163.

See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242-43

(D. Colo. 2006).

164. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (2000).
165.

High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1249.

166. Id. at 1235.
167. Id. at 1243.
168. 16 U.SC. § 1 (2000).
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national park.' 69 In addition, the lawsuit claimed that the government
failed to perform an environmental review before taking a major action
that would have significant environmental effects, thereby violating the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the court
lacked jurisdiction over some of the claims, and that others provided'no
grounds for the court to grant relief.171 Central to this motion was its
characterization of the 2003 agreement as simply a change in the
government's litigation position in the water court case over the Black
Canyon water right. 72 As such, the government's action was committed
to the agency's discretion and unreviewable by the court: the brief
stated that the Interior Secretary had broad discretion in deciding how
to meet the water needs of both the park and the Aspinall Unit, and
that "courts have long acknowledged that the Attorney General's
173
litigation positions are presumptively immune from judicial review."
Similarly, the NEPA claim had to fail because a federal regulation
excluded the Justice Department's litigation decisions from the scope of
federal actions requiring environmental reviews. 174 As for the unlawful
disposition claim, the government argued that the Black Canyon
reserved right had never been quantified and thus was never federal
property, despite the 1978 decree. 7 5
One of the government's primary arguments, however, was that the
federal court should abstain in favor of the state water court case. The
motion to dismiss stated that if the federal court were to determine
whether the 2003 agreement violated federal agency duties to protect
the park, it would "intrude into the reserved rights determination
properly before the water court... How much water is necessary to
fulfill the Park's puroses is the very question now pending before the
state water court."T76 Citing federal and state cases applying the
McCarran- Amendment, the government argued that if the federal court
were to inquire into the adequacy of the park's water rights, it would
"frustrate Congress' intent to give primacy to state determinations of
water rights and encroach upon the state courts' traditional role as
arbiter of water rights disputes." 177 The motion to dismiss did not
mention that McCarran had not stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction over reserved right claims, or that the Supreme Court had
not required abstention in favor of state court adjudications under

169. 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-2 (2000).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (2000).
171. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448
F.Supp.2d 1235 (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712) (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2003).

172. Seeid. at22-24.
173. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 23 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 516).
174. Id. at 29 (citing 28 C.F.R § 61.4).

175. Id.
176. Id. at 17.
177. Id. at 18.
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McCarran. 178 The clear message was that the federal court should steer
clear because the case involved a dispute over water rights that were the
subject of ongoing litigation in state water court.
The district court would have none of it, rejecting the government's
arguments and its framing of several issues. 179 In denying the motion to.
dismiss, the court wrote that it "fails to view the decision to relinquish
the federal water rights in the state water court as a 'litigation strategy'
of the Attorney General."' The real issue, said the court, was the April
2003 agreement between the Interior Department and the State, which
was an agency action that may have violated an affirmative statutory duty
to protect the park.' 8 ' Judge Brimmer also held the Black Canyon
reserved right was indeed federal property, rejecting the argument that
disposed of nothing because the right had never
the government 8had
2
been quantified.
Most significantly, the district court refused to view the federal
challenge as improperly duplicative of the state court litigation. The
water court case would address the exact quantity of water needed to
meet the purposes of the Black Canyon reservation; the federal case, by
contrast, would review agency decisions for compliance with federal
law. 83 The court stated that it had exclusive jurisdiction over cases
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge federal
agency action, and that if plaintiffs prevailed, the remedy would be a
remand to the agency rather than a quantification of park water
rights. 8 4 Because the two cases were sufficiently different, the challenge
to the 2003 agreements was not subject to the McCarran Amendment,
and would therefore proceed in federal court.
The litigation proceeded to the merits, where in essence the key
question was the adequacy of the 2003 agreements in protecting park
resources: did the 300 cfs reserved right, coupled with the variable statelaw instream flow right, provide enough water with enough certainty to
meet the Black Canyon's needs? 8 5 The extensive administrative record
(exceeding 13,000 pages) provided clear documentation that the park
needed more water than a 300 cfs base flow. 186 The government argued
not that 300 cfs was adequate, but that the Colorado instream flow right
provided a sound alternative approach to meeting the park's water

178. Id.
179. See generally Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, Civ. No. 03-WY-1712 (D. Colo Apr. 19, 2004).
180. Id. at 16.
181. Id. at 16-17.
182. Id. at 20-21.
183. Id. at 15-16.
184. Id.at 15.
185. Seeid. at21.
186. See, e.g., Letter from Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Greg Walcher, Executive Director, Colo. Dep't of
Natural Res. (May 9, 2003) (Administrative Record at 5941, High Country Citizens'
Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712)
(explaining scientific basis for peak and shoulder flow claims for park).
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needs, and that the 2003 agreements were "intended" to provide a
hydrograph with base, peak, and shoulder flows- the elements needed
to protect the park. 18 7 Far less clear, however, was whether the park
would actually receive such flows under these agreements. Assistant
Interior Secretary Craig Manson's qualified defense was not the type to
inspire much confidence:
And is it an ironclad guarantee? No. We've said all along and been
up-front about that. The April 2nd agreement said there is no
guarantee that these same amounts can be available in the future. Is it
illusory? No, it's not illusory either. It's clear there will be sufficient
water available to the Park. And it's clear that the chart in the April
2nd agreement, while neither an ironclad guarantee nor illusory, is
the type of evidence
88 that prudent people rely upon in making
important decisions. 1
The United States did not suggest that a 2003 instream flow right
would provide the necessary flows as reliably as a 1933 reserved right
would.
Instead, the government argued that its decision was
appropriate because of the need to balance preserving the resources of
the Black Canyon with protecting the functions of the Aspinall Unit:
"Congress' decision to build Aspinall effectively modified the
Secretary's obligations under the [Park Service] Organic Act with
respect to this Park."' 89 The government did not specify the exact
source or nature of this modification, but emphasized that the
Colorado River Storage Project Act directed that the Aspinall Unit be
built to store "no less than 940,000 acre-feet of water, an amount of
water Congress had been informed would amount to all of the spring
run-off from the basin in most years."190 Because a substantial reserved
right might prevent storage of that amount, the Department of the
Interior saw a conflict between its duty to protect the park under the
general language of the Organic Act, and its obligations under the
specific statutory language authorizing the Aspinall Unit. 19. The 2001
quantification application had called for a larger reserved right, but also
for consultation among federal agencies on how to exercise the right
each year. 192 The government contended that the 2003 agreements
were "a different but eminently sensible way" for the Department of the
Interior to resolve the apparent statutory conflict: "Rather than
continue to insist on a massive reserved right with a necessary but
amorphous 'consultation' component, the Secretary chose instead to
have a concrete reserved right, a peak flow fully protected through state
187. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supranote 88, at 56.
188. Transcript of Hearing at 167, Colorado Water Conservation Board Hearing on
Staff Recommendation of the Gunnison River Instream Flow Appropriation, Nov. 19,
2003 (Administrative Record at 7932, High Country Citizens' Alliance, Civ. No. 03-WY1712).
189. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 60.
190. Id. at 61.
191.

Id.

192. Id.at 23-24.
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law, and to provide1 93mid-range and shoulder flows through operation of
the Aspinall Unit."

The United States also maintained its position that the case was
unreviewable in federal court. Its primary arguments were that the
Administrative Procedure Act precluded review of the challenged
decisions, either because the decisions did not constitute "agency
actions" or because they were committed to the agency's discretion
under the relevant statutes.'94 In addition, the government resumed its
argument that the federal court could not grant relief without
improperly treading on the water court's turf.'95 In maintaining that
the 2003 agreements did not dispose of any federal property, the
government contended that the court would intrude on the state
court's jurisdiction if it issued an order determining that the United
States did not retain a reserved right sufficient to protect the park.'96
"[T]o accept Plaintiffs' theory requires this court to determine that the
federal reserved water right for the park exists in a quantity in excess of
300 cfs," the government argued.'97 "Any order which would define the
parameters of the water right must be left to the water court."'98
In deciding High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, the court
again brushed aside government arguments on reviewabillty 9 9 The
agreements were specific agency actions reviewable under the APA, said
the court, unlike the agency failure to act which the Supreme Court
found unreviewable in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.2"'
And while the government did have some discretion in its duty to
protect park resources, there was law to apply in measuring the exercise
of that discretion, so the agreements fell outside the "committed to
agency discretion by law" exception to judicial review. 20 ' This time, the
court made no mention of the water court jurisdiction issue.
The court was equally unimpressed by the government's position on
the merits and held for the plaintiffs on all of their claims. 2° 2 On the

crucial question of whether the 2003 agreements adequately protected
the park, the court stressed the importance of the reserved right's 1933
priority date, and determined that the 2003 agreements reduced
protection for the Black Canyon by permanently subordinating it to the
Aspinall Unit. 2

3

"Unlike forgoing a call on the river in dry years, as

contemplated by the 2001 quantification application, the April and July
agreements were a means to deprive the National Park Service of ever
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id. at 48-50.
195. Id.at 69.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199.
2006).
200.
201.
202.
203.

High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (D. Colo.
Id. at 1249 (distinguishing 542 U.S. 55 (2004)).
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1253.
Id
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204
exercising a right to peak and shoulder flows of the Gunnison River. )
The court also held that the government had unlawfully disposed of
federal property, delegated its park protection duties to a state agency,
and taken a major federal action without conducting the environmental
review required by NEPA.2 °5 On this latter point, the court stressed the
importance of public participation in a decision with great long-term
significance for a national park: "A decision to enter into agreements
which permanently give up a priority to a resource which must be 'saved
for all generations' must be made in public view and not behind closed
doors. ,206
The United States filed a notice of appeal but ultimately chose not
to seek review in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 °7
The
environmental plaintiffs had received their day in federal court and
prevailed. Because the district court had simply remanded the matter
to the agency, 2 8 however, the final outcome for the Black Canyon was
still far from certain.

E. THE REAL DEAL: THE 2008

SETTLEMENT

Rather than return to court, the parties chose mediation to resolve
the Black Canyon water rights controversy.2 9
Thirty entities
participated in the mediation, including not only the United States and
the State of Colorado, but also five cities and towns, six
environmental/conservation groups (three national and three local),
five water districts, four counties, and three farm bureaus. 2 0 The. talks
produced an agreement that the parties announced in June 2008.211
Like the 2003 agreements, the settlement provides the park a range
of instream flows that will vary depending on the forecasted inflow to
Blue Mesa Reservoir, the Aspinall Unit's major storage facility. 212 But in
other key respects, the settlement differs significantly from the earlier
agreements. The reserved right now encompasses the full range of
flows (notjust a base flow) for the Black Canyon and does not rely on a
Colorado instream flow right.21 3 The settlement also specifies peak and

shoulder flows for the park based on Blue Mesa inflows, rather than
204. Id.at 1252.
205. Id. at 1243, 1246, 1248.
206. Id.at 1245-46.
207. See Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of
the Gunnison National Park Attachment C at 2, In reWater Rights for the United States
of America, No. O1CW05 (Colo. Water Div. 4Jan. 8, 2009).
208. High Country Citizens'Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1253.
209. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supra note 207, at Attachment C.
210. Id.
211. Black Canyon NationalPark Gets Its Water, HIGH COUNTRY REP. (High Country
Citizens' Alliance, Crested Butte, Colo.), Summer 2008 at 1.
212. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supra note 207, at Attachment C, at 7-9. Attachment B
includes a different list of the thirty parties than Attachment C of the final decree, and
Attachment C lists only one farm bureau.
213. Id.at 6-9.
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simply providing a formula for determining the total volume of water
available for such flows. 2 14 Perhaps most significantly, park water rights

are no longer effectively subordinated to the Aspinall Unit 215, including
potential future changes that could have reduced flows through the
Black Canyon. Yet the agreement includes protection for various
interests;

for

example,

it preserves

flood

control

operations,2

6

subordinates the park reserved right to certain water uses (including all
uses senior to the Aspinall Unit),2" 7 and allows the Aspinall Unit to
release lesser peak21flows
if drought has reduced reservoir storage to
8
specified low levels.

On January 8, 2009, the Colorado water court issued a final decree
for the Black Canyon National Park reserved right based on the
settlement reached in August.2 19 In entering the decree the court noted
that thirty parties, including all the parties to the mediation, had
formally approved the decree, and another 157 parties had agreed to
withdraw their opposition based on the settlement. 22° The decree said a
mouthful in a single sentence on the last page: 'This Decree was
entered pursuant to agreement of the parties to address their interests
and concerns and resolves them finally in this matter." 221 So ended the
quantification controversy that had spanned all eight years of the Bush
Administration and delayed confirmation of a claim pending since the
1970s.
Four months after the decree, a story appeared in the Denver Post
describing how the water right settlement would soon lead to higher
flows in the Gunnison River for the benefit of the Black Canyon
ecosystem. 2222 The story explained that the Aspinall Unit had reduced
average peak flows in the river to22about
1700 cfs, but that the 2009 peak
flow would be around 6,000 cfs 3-similar to the average peak before
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 11; Colo.Div. of Water Res., Concerningthe Tabulation of Water Rights in
Water
Division
4,
90-91
tbl.
1
(2008),
available
at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/tabulation/divltabulation.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
216. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supia note 207, at Attachment C, at 9 (noting that flood
control remains the highest operational priority of the Aspinal Unit, and the decree
does not affect flood control operations).
217. Id.at 4, 5, 11 (stating that the Black Canyon water right carries a 1933 priority;
the Aspinall Unit water rights have a 1957 priority; and providing that the federal
government "shall subordinate the Black Canyon Right to all water rights with
adjudicated priorities that are senior to the Aspinall Unit Rights").
218. Id. at 10 (specifying when the United States may release lesser peak flows due to
drought, and providing a formula for determining such flows).
219. Id.at 13.
220. Id. at 2, Attachments B and C.
221. Id. at 13.
222. Mark Jaffe, Black Canyon River Rlows Swell After 36-year Fight, DENVER POST,
May 8, 2009, at Bl.
223. Id.; see also U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Information System: Daily
Data
for
Gauge
USGS
09128000
available
at
http://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/co/nwis/dvstat/?referred-module=sw&siteno=091280
00&por_09128000_4=345637,00060,4,1910-10-01,2009-10-26&startdt=2009-05-
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1937. The article quoted the park's chief of resource stewardship
as
224
saying, "This is the beginning of a return to a more natural river.
I. FEDERALJUDICIAL REVIEWABILIY OF RESERVED RIGHT
SETTLEMENTS
The plaintiffs in High Country Citizens' Alliance sued to challenge
a federal agency's effort to partially settle a reserved water right claim
pending in state court.225 They convinced a federal court to do what
few others have done since the ColoradoRiver case: reach the merits of
a federal lawsuit relating to reserved water rights. High Country
Citizens' Alliance thus indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
federal courts may yet decide certain issues relating to federal water
right claims, even where those claims are pending in a state court
adjudication.
High Country Citizens' Alliance may prove to have somewhat
limited value as precedent for two main reasons. First, and most
obviously, it is a district court case; Judge Brimmer's decision never
reached the Tenth Circuit after the United States chose not to appeal.
Second, High Country Citizens' Alliance involves unusual facts: the
challenged agency action was not the filing of a reserved right claim,
the withdrawal of a claim, or even the final settlement of a claim, but
rather a signed agreement to limit a claim that was still pending in state
court.2 26 Such an agreement is certainly not necessary for resolving a
reserved right claim, and in future cases, parties could easily skip that
intermediate step and proceed directly to final settlement. The key
question, then, is whether final settlement of a federal reserved right
227
claim in a state proceeding is properly reviewable in federal court.
This section addresses that question, and concludes that the answer is
yes.

01&end dt=2009-05-30&format=html table&stat cds=max va&date format=YYYY-MMDD&rdbcompression=file&submittedform=parameter selection-list (last visited Feb.
20, 2010) (provisional data subject to, revision) (In fact, the Gunnison through the
Black Canyon actually peaked at about 6700 cfs on May 13, 2009.)
224. MarkJaffe, supranote 222, at BI.
225. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (D.
Colo. 2006).
226. See id,
227. See SAX, supra note 60, at 864 (As noted earlier, this article focuses on federal,
non-Indian reserved right claims. Reviewability of tribal reserved right settlements may
differ from settlement of federal claims, largely because they typically do not become
effective until ratified by Congress, and sometimes by the legislature of the affected state
and the government of the tribe whose rights are being determined.); Ann R. Klee &
Duane Mecham, The Nez Perce Indian Water Right Settlement-Fedeal Perspective,
42 IDAHO L. REV. 595, 607 (2006) (noting that following agreement on the terms of
settlement for the water right claims of the Nez Perce Tribe, "federal, state, and tribal
legislative approvals[ ] had to be sought from the legislative branches of government").
The need for Congressional approval before a settlement takes effect may affect the
finality of agency action regarding the settlement, and the shift of proceedings to the
legislative forum may affect ripeness of the agreement for judicial review.
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A. APA REVIEW PROVISIONS
The APA does not provide for judicial review in every instance
where an agency has done something. Judicial review is precluded in
some situations, including those where an agency has essentially
complete discretion.2 2 8 Otherwise, the APA provides for judicial review
of any "final agency action."229 This latter provision effectively imposes
two requirements on suits brought under the APA: there must be
agency action,23 ° and the action must be final.23 '
1. Action committed to agency discretion
An agency action may be final but still unreviewable under the APA
if it is "committed to agency discretion by law."232 An agency may enjoy
judicially unchecked discretion based on statutory text, either if the
statute specifically confers total discretion on an agency in taking a
certain kind of action,233 or if the language is so broad and general that
a court believes it has "no law to apply" in measuring an agency's
exercise of discretion.2 34 The nature of the agency's decision is also a
relevant factor. For example, where an agency opted not to bring an
enforcement action for a particular violation of law, the Supreme Court
held that the decision was committed to agency discretion because it
was analogous to a prosecutor's decision not to indict a potential
criminal defendant, a choice that courts traditionally have not
reviewed.235
In High Country Citizens' Alliance, the United States insisted that
the court could not review the 2003 Black Canyon agreements because
they were simply litigation decisions that were legally committed to the
government's discretion. 236 This argument against judicial reviewability
had some force in that case, especially because the 2003 agreements did
23 7
not settle the Black Canyon reserved right claim, but only reduced it.
The government's motion to dismiss cited a statute that gives the
Department of Justice control over the conduct of litigation involving

228. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2007). But see 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(1) (stating that review
may also be precluded by statute).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.").
230. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004).
231. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
232. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2).
233. Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988).
234. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
235. Id.at 831-32.
236. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants'
Dispositive Motion at 22-25, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d
1235 (D. Colo. 2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712).
237. Id.
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federal agencies,"' along with Supreme Court cases denying review of
certain litigation decisions by the Attorney General.239 It also relied on
a case from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, denying
review of the government's decision not to file certain tribal reserved
right claims in Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication. 4 °
The court rejected this argument in High Country Citizens'
Alliance. In denying the government's motion to dismiss, the court
noted that the Interior Department made the 2003 agreements, and the
Justice Department's subsequent motion to amend the claim in light of
the agreements could not insulate those actions from review. 24' The
court also noted that the law limits the Justice Department's discretion:
"Notwithstanding the 'plenary authority' of the Attorney General to
control litigation 'the Attorney General in representing a government
agency is bound by the same laws that control the agency.' 2 12 In its
decision on the merits, the court brushed aside this argument in the
context of the NEPA claim,243 concluding that the government was
merely "labeling" the 2003 agreements as a litigation decision:
"Defendants cannot shield their conduct from review or from the ambit
of NEPA simply because [they] have advocated their position in water
court."244

The "litigation decision" argument won the day, however, in a case
involving the government's decision not to assert Winters claims on
behalf of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes in an Idaho adjudication.245
The District of Columbia Circuit relied not only on the statute (28
U.S.C. § 516) and cases giving the Justice Department general control
of government litigation,2 46 but also on the leading Supreme Court case
interpreting the "committed to agency discretion" provision of the
APA.247 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that an agency's
refusal to take enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable
238. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supm note 88, at 23 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 516 (2007)) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . .. is reserved to
officers of the Department ofJustice, under the direction of the Attorney General.").
239. Id.(citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (decision involving
criminal proceedings) and Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) (decision involving
Voting Rights Act)).
240. Id at 24 (citing Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
241. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supa note 179, at 16.
242. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Executive Bus. Media, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 3 F.3d 759,
761-62 (4th Cir. 1993).
243. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 179, at 29 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 61.4 to support argument that its actions were not subject to NEPA because of a
Justice Department regulation stating that Justice. Department litigation actions were
not "major federal actions" within the meaning of NEPA).
244. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1246 n.3 (D.
Colo. 2006).
245. Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
246. Id. at 1480-81.
247. Id. at 1481 ("The circumstances [of this case] resemble, in many respects, those

of Heckler v. Chaney... in which an agency refused to enforce its regulations.").
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because such decisions are ordinarily committed to agency discretion.24
The District of Columbia Circuit stated that the Heckler Court's reasons
for denying review "fully apply to this case" 49 where the Justice
Department had declined to file water right claims in a state
proceeding. "Courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the factors that go into
a decision not to bring suit or to enforce regulations."2 50 The court
noted, however, that under Heckler, even a non-enforcement decision
could be reviewable if Congress had "provided meaningful standards
for defining the limits" of an agency's enforcement discretion. 25' The
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe could point to no law limiting the exercise of
the Attorney General's discretion in the context of that case, however,
review of the government's
so it failed to rebut the presumption against
252
decision not to file water right claims.

Shoshone-Bannock might appear to suggest that decisions
regarding reserved right litigation are committed to agency discretion,
but for purposes of reviewability there is a crucial difference between
settling a claim, and declining to file a claim. The former involves a
specific action by the agency-an agreement to resolve a claim on
specific terms-whereas the latter is a refusal to act.25 3 Section 706(1)

of the APA allows a court to "compel agency action unlawfully
withheld," 254 but the plaintiff carries a heavy burden in such a case; the
Supreme Court has stated that "a claim under § 706(1) can proceed
only where a plaintiff asserts that a [federal] agency failed to take a
Thus, the
discrete agency action that it is required to take. 255
Shoshone-Bannock court correctly evaluated the relevant treaty, statute,
and other sources of law to determine if they required the government
to file certain claims on the Tribes' behalf. A final settlement, however,
would be reviewable under § 706(2) of the APA, allowing a court to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action" 25 6 on any of several
grounds.257 This distinction appears to be the pivotal difference
between Shoshone-Bannock, in which the court denied judicial review
of the Attorney General's decision, 258 and High Country Citizens'
Alliance, in which the court held that the 2003 Black Canyon
248. Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
249. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1481.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.at 1483-84.
254. A court may also compel action "unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(2006).
255. Norton v. S.Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
257. For example, a court may set aside agency action that it finds contrary to statute,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C), or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
258. The court held that because no existing law required the government to file
these particular claims on behalf of the Tribes, "judicial review of the Attorney
General's decision is consequently unavailable

Reno, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

....

"

Shoshone Bannock Tribes v.

Issue 2

BLACK CANYON

agreements constituted reviewable agency actions.25 9
In a reserved rights adjudication, most of the government's
actions-including the filing, defense, and proof of its claims-may
appropriately be viewed as litigation decisions. For several reasons,
however, final reserved rights settlements should generally be regarded
as final agency actions subject to federal judicial review. First, the
government's decision to settle a reserved right claim does not so much
involve the conduct of litigation as the conclusion of it; even though
every decision regarding the claim will involve the same complex
judgment calls about the likelihood of success, a settlement represents a
final resolution of a reserved right, and can therefore be evaluated on
its substantive (not merely tactical) merits.
Second, while the Justice Department handles federal litigation, it is
the management agencies (e.g. the National Park Service or the U.S.
Forest Service) that are responsible for stewardship of the lands and
waters within their jurisdiction. 60 Under the "litigation decision"
theory, however, the Justice Department would have absolute and
unreviewable discretion over all reserved water rights that have not yet
been quantified. Alone or in collusion with the management agencies,
the Justice Department could either settle or dismiss all pending
reserved right claims on any terms whatsoever, depriving federal lands
of water rights, absolving management agencies of any duties regarding
those water rights, and effectively abrogating the Winters doctrine.
That kind of wholesale surrender of reserved rights is unlikely, to say
the least-but if all final settlements were within the absolute discretion
of the government, such an action would be entirely unreviewable in
the federal courts26 ' , casting doubt on the validity of that position.
Third, a government decision to settle its reserved water right claims
is very different from an agency decision not to bring an enforcement
action, as in Heckler. If an agency refuses to bring an enforcement
action in a particular situation, a violation may go unremedied and a
violator may escape sanctions, but neither the law nor the agency's
authority has changed: the agency may take action against the next
similar violation, or the next transgression by the alleged violator.262 A
reserved right settlement, by contrast, means that the federal
government's legal interest in water-its entitlement to obtain water in
satisfaction of the specific purposes for which Congress or the President
designated that land-are finally and permanently fixed. 263 Even if the
government made a mistake in pursuing its reserved water rights, it
ordinarily cannot go back and obtain a reserved right to water for
additional purposes, or additional water for the original purposes; the

259. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1249 (D. Colo.
2006).
260. SeeS. Utah Wilderness Aliance, 542 U.S. at 66-67.
261. See High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1249-50.
262. Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
263. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1479.
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2"
decreed water rights are resjudicata.
Given that a reserved rights
settlement carries serious consequences that are both legal and eternal,
any uncertainty as to the reviewability of the government action should
be resolved in favor of allowing review.

2. Final agency action
When a federal agency strikes a deal with adjudication parties
regarding its reserved water rights, and agrees to settle its claims
according to that deal, it has almost certainly taken an "action" for
purposes of judicial reviewability. The APA defines "agency action"
through a list, which "includes the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act;"265 several of these terms are similarly "defined."266 Exactly
how a particular water rights settlement
would fit this definition may
267
depend on the terms of the agreement.
As the Supreme Court has stated, however, "The bite in the phrase
'final action' ... is not in the word 'action,' which is meant to cover
comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its
power. It is rather in the word 'final'.... 2 6 8 In order to qualify as
"final," agency action must "mark the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process, and must either
determine rights or
269
obligations or occasion legal consequences."

In most cases, a settlement of federal reserved water rights would
clearly meet this standard for finality, even though the settlement would
still require the approval of the state adjudication court. The agency
completes its decisionmaking process-in this case, negotiations with
other parties to the adjudication of the agency's claim-when the
264. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135, 145 (1983). This same argument
would apply equally to a decision not to assert reserved water right claims in a pending
adjudication. In holding that the government's refusal to assert certain tribal reserved
rights was unreviewable, the D.C. Circuit appears not to have considered this point.
Instead, the Court's analysis focused on whether the Attorney General had a specific,
nondiscretionary duty based on treaty or statute to assert certain claims requested by the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Based on its review of the relevant law, the court found
none. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1481-84.
265. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).
266. For example, the definition of "sanction" has seven subparts, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (10),
and the definition of "relief" has three, 5 U.S.C. § 551(11), including agency
.recognition of a claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception." 5 U.S.C. §
551(11) (B).

267. Typically, these settlements will not only recognize and quantify a reserved water
right, but will also subordinate that right to existing. private water users, giving them
greater security in times of shortage than the law would otherwise provide. See infra
note 358 and accompanying text. By giving this kind of preferred position to other
water users, the agreement evidently would fit the APA definition of "relief," which
includes agency recognition of an "immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception." 5
U.S.C. § 551 (11)(B). A reserved right settlement might also qualify as an order, which
the APA defines in almost catchall terms as "a final disposition . . .of an agency in a
matter other than rule making .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).
268. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001).
269. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483 (2004) (internal
quotations omitted).
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agency signs an agreement specifying terms of the settlement. The
agency certainly intends the agreement to determine rights and
obligations of the parties-that, of course, is the whole point of the
deal-although no rights will be final until the state adjudication court
approves the settlement. Upon approval, however, the reserved rights
as provided in the agreement would become resjudicata, effectively
mooting any challenge in federal court.270 A settlement pending
judicial approval has legal consequences because it represents a
conclusive, specific determination of the reserved rights from the
standpoint of the adjudication parties, at the latest stage where a2 federal
71
court could still review its legality and provide meaningful relief.
A reserved right settlement might not qualify as final agency action
if Congress must approve it before it can take effect. Unlike tribal
reserved right agreements, however, federal reserved right settlements
do not typically require Congressional action to become effective.'2 72
B. RIPENESS

Even if an agency action is final and the APA does not preclude
review, a court may still deny review if it determines that the case is not
ripe. 273 In evaluating ripeness, a federal court must assess "both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration." 274 Determining fitness of the
issues for judicial review involves two questions: whether further factual
development would assist the court in deciding the matter, and whether
judicial review at this stage
would "inappropriately interfere with further
275
administrative action.
Once an agency has reached a final settlement of a reserved right
claim, the matter would appear ripe. Regarding fitness, there is no
obvious reason why the issues would not be ready for judicial review.
Once all the parties have reached an agreement, there is neither the
need, nor the opportunity, for further factual development: the agency
has made a final decision regarding its reserved right claim, and the
only question is whether that decision is legally sufficient. 276 Nor is it
270. The Colorado water court and Supreme Court both emphasized this point in
deciding that it was appropriate to stay the water court proceeding to quantify the Black
Canyon reserved right, pending the outcome of the federal court challenge to the 2003
agreements. See supm notes 259, 264 and accompanying text.
271. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1249 (D. Colo.
2006).
272. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
273. E.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810-12
(2003) (denying review of the final Department of the. Interior rule for lack of
ripeness); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478-80 (concluding that the final agency action was
subject to and ripe for review).
274. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
275. Id.
276. See United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003). Ripeness seems
much more doubtful at stages before final settlement, including the filing of reserved
right claims by the government. If the United States were to file a claim that could be
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likely that review would interfere with agency action, given that the
agency has concluded negotiations and reached a final agreement
regarding its claims. Finally, plaintiffs seeking federal judicial review of
a reserved right settlement could argue persuasively that they would
suffer irreparable harm if a court denied review, because if the state
adjudication court approved the settlement and entered a final decree,
the reserved right would be resjudicata as decreed. The Colorado
Supreme Court recognized this potential harm in upholding the water
court's stay of proceedings on the Black Canyon reserved right,
pending the277 outcome of the federal court case over the 2003
agreements.

One might argue that federal judicial review of a final settlement
might not inappropriately interfere with the agency's work, but that it
would interfere with the ongoing state court adjudication. Although
not based on the Supreme Court's factors for assessing ripeness, this
argument finds some support in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
278 In Braren, the
States v. Braren.
government and the Klamath Tribes
sought federal review of the State of Oregon's proposed standard for
quantifying certain tribal reserved rights in the Klamath Adjudication,
arguing that the standard was contrary to an earlier Ninth Circuit
decision establishing the existence and purposes of those rights.279
Because the federal courts left the quantification of the tribal rights to
the state adjudication, however, the Ninth Circuit held in Braren that
the challenge to Oregon's proposed standard was not ripe
0 for review,
and would not be so until the adjudication was complete.
Braren, however, does not resemble a case challenging a final
settlement of a reserved water right. First, and crucially for purposes of
judicial review under the APA, that case involved a statement by Oregon
officials, not federal agency action.28 ' Second, the standard at issue in
Braren was preliminary; it had not yet been adopted within the
adjudication, and the water rights that would be affected by it were still

challenged as substantively inadequate-if, for example, the government claimed an
amount of water that was arguably insufficient to satisfy the purposes of the federal
reservation-one could argue that a federal court should review the claim, because it
would effectively put a ceiling on the amount of water that the reserved right would
receive through the adjudication. At this early stage, however, a court certainly could
conclude that further factual development (through the adjudication process) would
aid its determination, and that review of the agency's decision in filing the claims could
interfere with the agency's work, including negotiations that could lead to settlement.
The filing of reserved right claims has practical consequences, but it seems likely that
judicial review of the agency's actions at this stage would be available only upon final
settlement. "A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action." 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2007).
277. In re Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1081
(Colo. 2004).
278. Braren, 338 F.3d at 972-73.
279. Id. at 975-76.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 973.
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far from a final determination.2 82 Finally, unlike a challenge to a federal
agency decision settling a federal water claim, the issue in Braren was
whether a federal court would order state officials to apply a certain
standard in their adjudication. 83 In short, neither Braren nor the
Supreme Court's ripeness factors suggest that a final settlement of a
federal reserved water right would be unripe for judicial review. 2 4 The
implications of federal review for the state proceeding are more
appropriately considered in the context of abstention.2 85
C. COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION

In its 1976 ColoradoRiver decision,8 6 the Supreme Court fashioned
a new doctrine of abstention to apply to a case involving a jurisdictional
dispute over federal and tribal reserved right claims. The Court
concluded that these claims fell within the jurisdiction of the Colorado
water courts under the McCarran Amendment, 287 as well as the United
States district courts. 288 In determining whether the district court
properly dismissed the government's reserved right claims in favor of a
water court proceeding,289 the Court noted the "virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them," 290 and stated that a federal court should defer to a concurrent
state proceeding only in "limited" and "exceptional" circumstances.291
The Court nonetheless held that dismissal of the federal case was
appropriate based on several factors, primarily what the Court called
the McCarran Amendment's
clear policy to avoid piecemeal litigation
293
of water claims.
In Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe, a case involving solely tribal

282. Id. at 975-76.
283. Id. at 972.
284. See id at 975-76. This conclusion may not hold for tribal reserved right
settlements, given that they typically do not become effective until ratified by certain
legislativebodies: Congress, the legislature of the affected state, and the government of
the tribe whose rights are being determined. See Klee et al., supra note 227, at 607.
Here again, the need for legislative approval does not fit cleanly within any of the
ripeness factors as stated by the Supreme Court. But as the debate over the reserved
right shifts from the courts to the legislatures, a court weighing a challenge to the
settlement might believe that it should defer consideration of the matter to the various
legislative bodies, and should direct opponents of the settlement to raise their concerns
in the legislative process.
285. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400,1404 (1983).
286. See Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805-06, 814-16
(1976).
287. Id. at 809-12.
288. Id. at 806-09 (stating that district courts have original jurisdiction of civil suits
brought by the United States).
289. Id. at 803-06 (explaining the history of the case).
290. Id. at 817.
291. Id. at 818.
292. Most of these factors were specific to the ColoradoRiver litigation, including the
lack of activity in the federal case, the number of Colorado defendants involved, and'
the 300-mile distance between the federal and state courts. Id. at 820.
293. See id. at 819.
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claims, the Supreme Court applied Colorado River and again found
that dismissal of federal proceedings was appropriate.2 94 The Court
held that McCarran (which says nothing about tribal water rights) had
conferred jurisdiction on state courts to adjudicate reserved right claims
asserted by tribes, 295 even upon states whose Enabling Acts appeared to
give them no authority. regarding tribal property. 21 Once again, the
Court gave controlling weight to McCarran's underlying policy, both in
determining the existence of state court jurisdiction,2 97 and in holding
that the federal courts
should step aside in favor of state adjudication of
1
298
reserved right claims.
These two Supreme Court cases strongly discourage concurrent
federal and state proceedings to determine reserved water rights, but
Colorado River abstention simply does not apply unless there is
concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claims. 299 The Supreme Court
stated in San Carlos Apache that it was "clear in [this case], as it was in
Colorado River, that a dismissal or stay of the federal suits would have
been improper if there was no jurisdiction in the concurrent state
0 Federal
actions to adjudicate the claims at issue in the federal suits."'O
courts clearly have jurisdiction over reserved right claims;..the major
question is whether state courts can also assertjurisdiction. In these two
cases, the Court read McCarran broadly to allow state courts to
adjudicate the full range of federal and tribal claims.
McCarran's waiver of federal sovereign immunity, however, extends
only to suits "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
294. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 545-547 (1983).
295. Id. at 561, 563-64.
296. In this case, the Enabling Acts of both Arizona and Montana seemed to limit
state authority over tribal rights. See id. at 556-59. Rather than analyze the meaning of
these specific provisions, the Court held that McCarran had conferred jurisdiction over
tribal claims on state courts regardless of the language of a particular state's enabling
act. Idat 563-64.
297. The Court believed that the policy of McCarran (as explicated in Colorado
River) would be undercut if certain states could adjudicate tribal water right claims and
others couldn't, based purely on the language of their state enabling statutes. The
Court believed this result would be contrary to Congress' intent in enacting McCarran:
The Amendment was designed to deal with a general problem arising out of
the limitations that federal sovereign immunity placed on the ability of the
States to adjudicate water rights, and nowhere in its text or legislative history
do we find any indication that Congress intended the efficacy of the remedy to
differ from one State to another.
Id. at 564.
298. After acknowledging the strength of the United States' and tribes' arguments
against dismissal of the federal case, the Court responded that "the most important
consideration in any federal water suit concurrent to a comprehensive state proceeding,
must be the 'policy underlying the McCarran Amendment."' Id. at 570 (quoting Colo.
River, 424 U.S. at 820).
299. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819.
300. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 559-60.
301. The Court held in ColoradoRiver that McCarran had not stripped the federal
courts ofjurisdiction over reserved right claims. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 807-09 (The
federal statute providing jurisdiction in that case was 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006)). Other
claims involving federal law may be heard under the general federal question
jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
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system or other source.., or [ ] for the administration of such
rights..."3o2 Under McCarran, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
an adjudication in state court can obtain jurisdiction over federal and
tribal reserved right claims because those claims will determine "rights
to the use of water."303 However, a challenge to a federal agency's
decision to settle a reserved right claim would fall outside the McCarran
Amendment; the case would determine the legality of the agency
action, not the existence and terms of a water right, leaving a state court
with no jurisdiction over the matter.
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to agency
action brought under the APA. Section 702 of the APA establishes a
right to judicial review3 4 for certain kinds of cases against federal
agencies and officials, 3 5 and provides for such cases to be brought "in a
court of the United States." 306 In rejecting state court jurisdiction over
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, in a case
challenging an order issued under the Clean Water Act, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 is expressly limited to
actions brought "in a court of the United States False" The legislative
history demonstrates that section 702 was not intended to effect a
waiver of sovereign immunity for suits against the United States or its
officers in state courts. "The consent to suit is also limited to claims in
the courts of the United States; 30 hence,
the United States remains
7
immune from suit in state courts."
The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts over APA claims in upholding the water
court's stay of proceedings to quantify the Black Canyon water rights
following the 2003 agreements. 3 8 The court rejected the argument
that the water court was a proper forum for determining whether the
government complied with federal law in reaching those agreements,
stating that McCarran "is not so broad that it allows state courts to

302. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (2006).
303. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 550-51.
304. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). The section is headed "Right of Review," and its first
sentence reads, "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof." Id.
305. Section 702 states that:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is
against the United States ....
5 U.S.C. § 702.
306. Id.
307. Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227, 1233
(9th Cir. 1982); see also 91 C.J.S. United States § 235 (2009).
308. In re Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080
(Colo. 2004).
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evaluate or adjudicate the federal agency decision making processes"
relating to the disputed agreements. 3°9 The court also noted that the
federal challenge to the settlement would have a different focus and
different outcome than the water court adjudication: "[t] he federal case
will decide whether the United States' amended application complied
with the applicable federal law, and the state case will quantify the
reserved water right.""'
Dissenting from the Colorado Supreme Court's holding, Justice
Hobbs admitted that challenges to agency action under the APA are
"normally an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. "31 He laid out the
best available argument for state court jurisdiction: that the challenge to
the 2003 agreements was really a claim that the Black Canyon was
entitled to more water than it would receive under those agreements,
that the federal plaintiffs were thus effectively seeking partial
quantification of the reserved right in federal court, and that the water
court was the proper forum for quantification. 312 "Although the claims
in the federal suit are styled as [APA] claims," Justice Hobbs wrote, "in
essence they challenge the exercise and scope of discretion in federal
313
agencies administering their water rights under state and federal law."
Because the federal claims really concerned quantification and
administration of the Black Canyon reserved right, in his dissenting
view, McCarran brought them within the jurisdiction of the water
court.31

4

The dissent correctly observed that the federal APA claims related
to the quantity, priority, and administration of the Black Canyon
reserved right. 31 5 In essence, the plaintiffs argued, and the court later

held, that the 2003 agreements violated federal law by protecting too
little water under the park's decreed 1933 priority, leaving the necessary
peak and shoulder flows to a vaguely defined 2003 water right held by
the State of Colorado. 31 6 The question is, does an APA claim-otherwise
exclusively federal-fall under state jurisdiction simply because it has
implications for a reserved right claim? Justice Hobbs answered yes in

the Black Canyon case based on his
view that McCarran confers very
7
broad jurisdiction on state courts.3

For several reasons, however, APA claims should not be subject to
state court jurisdiction even though they relate to a reserved right claim
subject to a state adjudication. Neither the statutory text nor the
Supreme Court caselaw supports the view that McCarran confers
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1072, 1086 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
312. Id.at 1084-85.
313. Id.at 1086.
314. The dissent suggested that McCarran gave the water court authority "to decide
all factual and legal issues involved" in the 2003 agreements, including "review of the
decision making of those officers and agencies regarding" the agreements. Id.
315. Id
316. Id. at 1083-84.
317. Id. at 1072, 1086 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction over any issue relating to a reserved right. According to
Justice Hobbs, 'The McCarran Amendment expressly provides for the
state court to decide all factual and legal issues affecting the
quantification and administration" of a federal water right." 8 But the
statute expresses no such thing, providing only that the United States
may be joined in any suit for the adjudication of water rights from a
particular source, or for the adjudication of such rights." 9 And
although the Supreme Court has referred to McCarran as "allinclusive, "32 that statement relates specifically to the various kinds of
water rights subject to the statute.3 21 For example, the Court has held
that state courts have jurisdiction over the full range of federal and
tribal water right claims,3 22 not that a state proceeding has jurisdiction
over any issue relating to a claimed right.
While it may be difficult to draw a precise line separating an
exclusively federal APA claim from a reserved right claim subject to
McCarran, that line surely exists. In other words, a federal claim cannot
be subject to state jurisdiction merely because it has some connectionno matter how attenuated-to a reserved right. Consider another
unlikely hypothetical: the government files federal bribery charges
against a private water user because he allegedly offered to pay off a
federal wildlife refuge manager if she would agree123to settle for a smaller
reserved right in an ongoing state adjudication.
Few would suggest
that the federal criminal charge would be subject to the adjudication,
even though it involves an effort to influence a federal water claim. But
the defendant would presumably like to have the local water court hear
the case, and he would have a credible argument if McCarran actually
did empower the state court "to decide all factual and legal issues
affecting the quantification and administration of the right."324 Thus, at
some point, a water-related claim must be so far removed from water
right adjudication that it falls outside of McCarran and becomes an
improper subject for the water court.
One final point is extremely important: a successful APA case
against a federal agency's settlement of reserved rights would not result
in the rights being determined or quantified in that case, as they would
be in an adjudication. Both the federal and state courts involved in the
Black Canyon dispute stressed this fact in rejecting the argument that
318. Id.at 1086.
319. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2007).
320. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976).
321. McCarran confers state court jurisdiction in water right adjudications 'where it
appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise." 43
U.S.C. § 666(a).
322. E.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 553, 563-64 (1983)
(tribal reserved rights asserted by tribes on their own behalf); Colo. River, 424 U.S. at
805, 808-09 (tribal reserved rights asserted by the United States); United States v. Dist.
Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (federal reserved rights).
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
324. See In reApplication for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1086
(Colo. 2004) (HobbsJ., dissenting).
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the federal lawsuit improperly intruded on the water court's domain.
In refusing to dismiss the APA action, the federal court wrote that the
water court proceeding would determine the precise quantity of water
needed to satisfy the purposes of the Black Canyon right under the
1978 decree, whereas the federal case
seeks review of federal administrative decisions for compliance with
various provisions of federal law, including federal statutory mandates
to preserve the environment of the Black Canyon. This Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims which challenge federal
administrative decisions and are brought pursuant to the judicial
review provisions of the APA. Plaintiffs are not asking this court to
determine the exact flow characteristics necessary to comply with the
federal mandates. Instead, if this Court finds Defendants have violated
the APA, this Court would order that Defendants' April Agreement
and July MOA be remanded with instructions that they reformulate
their management of the Black Canyon to comply with federal
mandates. Therefore, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction since it is
not holding parallel proceedings as the issues are not substantially
.the
25
same and thus, do not fall under the McCarran Amendment.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the federal
case could not and would not quantify the water right, the water court
did not abdicate its jurisdiction in staying its consideration of the Black
Canyon claim.326 Further, the court emphasized that the results of the
federal case would not be resjudicatain the water court quantification
proceeding, in which water users "may still argue that the purposes of
the United States' reservation of the Black Canyon are narrow, 'and
that
27
purposes.
those
satisfy
to
adequate
is
water
of
amount
a modest
These courts were correct in finding exclusive federal jurisdiction
over APA claims that would address the legality of federal agency action,
but would not finally determine any aspect of a federal water right. This
distinction provides a practical, objective, and legally sound basis for
determining when a challenge to a reserved right settlement is within
state court jurisdiction: if deciding a federal claim would conclusively
28
establish the existence, priority, purposes, or quantity of a water right
subject to a state adjudication under McCarran, the claim falls under
state court jurisdiction. Otherwise, the claim must be heard in federal
court in accordance with the usual rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction
over APA claims.
In sum, a challenge to a federal agency's final settlement of its
reserved right claims ordinarily should qualify for federal judicial
review, consistent with the results in the Black Canyon cases. That legal
conclusion, however, raises new questions about the practical and policy

325. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 179, at 16.
326. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d at 1084.
327. Id.
328. The Black Canyon cases focused only on this last element, quantification,
because the 1978 water court decree already established the existence, priority, and
purposes of the park reserved right. See supra notes 308-24.
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implications of federal judicial review of such settlements. The next
section addresses these implications.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RESERVED
RIGHT SETTLEMENTS
In High Country Citizens' Alliance, environmental plaintiffs
obtained federal judicial review of a partial settlement of federal
reserved water rights subject to a state adjudication, and they convinced
the court to overturn the settlement and remand the matter to the
Interior Department. 29 The court's decision revealed that a federal
judicial forum is potentially available for APA claims relating to agency
decisions on reserved rights, and the previous section of this article
concluded that final settlements of federal claims should indeed be
reviewable in federal court. 30 Assuming that conclusion is correct, what
might this new opportunity for federal review mean for reserved water
rights, which for three decades have been determined almost entirely in
the context of state proceedings? This section contends that federal
review of final settlements would have very limited impacts on reserved
right litigation, but may have greater effects on efforts to resolve
reserved right claims through negotiated settlements.
A. LIMITED EFFECTS ON LITIGATION OF RESERVED RIGHT CLAIMS

Given the long-running jurisdictional battles between western states
and water users on one side, and the United States government and
tribes on the other,3 1 one might expect the prospect of a federal
judicial forum for reserved right issues to provoke great concern and
great excitement, respectively, in these two camps. Three years after
the court's decision in High Country Citizens' Alliance, however, the
issue has received little attention.3 2 This absence of reaction suggests
that federal APA review of settlements would have fairly minor
implications for reserved right litigation, and a review of the relevant
law brings up several reasons why that is almost certainly true.
First, and most obviously, McCarran and the applicable Supreme
Court cases are still in effect. Reserved water right claims remain
subject to state court jurisdiction, and federal courts are still
encouraged to abstain from hearing such claims in favor of state
adjudication proceedings. Thus, the federal government is no freer to
pursue determination of its reserved right claims in federal court; to the
contrary, the federal forum is available only to someone who sues the
329. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
330. See supia notes 328-28 and accompanying text.
331. See supranotes 286-320 and accompanying text.
332. As of late March 2010, the High Country Citizens' Alliance decision had been
cited in no cases-only a few treatises, three journal articles, and a handful of briefs and
motions. Westlaw.com, Citing References for High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.
Supp.
2d.
1235
(D.
Colo.
2006),
http://web2.westlaw.com/Find/default.wl?bhcp= 1&cite=448+F%2ESupp%2E2d+1235
&rs=LAWS2%2E0&strRecreate=no&sv=Split&vr=1%2E0 (last visited March 20, 2010).
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government seeking APA review of a final agency action, i.e., a
settlement agreement.
Second, federal review of settlements does not change the
substantive law that determines federal water right claims. Reserved
rights have always been a matter of federal law, even when they are
adjudicated in state courts-a point made repeatedly by the Supreme
Court.333 Moreover, federal judicial review of state court reserved right
decrees has always been available in the U.S. Supreme Court. While
such review has been quite rare in practice, 334 the Court gave a stern
reminder in Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe that state courts do not
have the last word in determining reserved water rights: "any state-court
decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law
can expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a
particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful
federal interest in safeguarding
those rights from
state
encroachment."33' 5 Given this established potential for Supreme Court
review of final state decrees, federal district court review of final
settlements is not such a dramatic development.
Third, federal APA review of settlements is likely to appeal primarily
to a fairly narrow group of entities: those who are interested in water
use, but do not hold or claim water rights. Water users claiming rights
under state law may oppose settlement of the reserved rights, but
because they likely are parties to the state adjudication, they already
have a forum that is more familiar, and perhaps friendlier, than the
federal district court. 36 They may be able to object to settlement during
the negotiation process, and if the reserved right is settled despite their
337
concerns, they certainly can argue against approval in the water court.
Federal APA review, however, may open the door to certain entities that

333. After holding that federal courts in Arizona and Montana should abstain from
hearing tribal reserved right claims in favor of state adjudications, the Court stated:
"We also emphasize, as we did in ColoradoRiver, that our decision in no way changes
the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water adjudications must be judged.
State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law."
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); see also Colo. River
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); United States v. Dist. Ct.
of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
334. The last two Supreme Court cases deciding federal (non-tribal) reserved right
claims on the merits were United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) and
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 128-29 (1976). The last tribal reserved right
decision was the Supreme Court's 4-4 split in Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406,
406 (1989) (affirming the reserved right decree of In re General Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988)).
335. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571.
336. 1 do not mean to suggest that water users might not also sue in federal court to
block a settlement. Irrigators have certainly sued under the federal environmental laws
in other contexts, especially those involving project operations by the Bureau of
Reclamation. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d
853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004); Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001).
337. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 409-10 (describing adjudication courts'
criteria and procedures for evaluating settlements, and noting that Arizona and
Montana courts both assess fairness and reasonableness of agreement).
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have little or no opportunity to affect the adjudication. 3 s The most
obvious beneficiaries are environmental groups (as in High Country
Citizens' Affiance), but others may include river-dependent businesses
(such as fishing lodges or commercial rafting companies), local
governments, or others who have a stake in water, but no rights of their
own.
Fourth, while opponents of reserved right settlements should be
able to have their claims heard in federal court, they typically will find
these cases hard to win. One problem is that the plaintiffs will be
attacking a negotiated settlement, which the government will certainly
argue is the best available compromise, one which provides adequate
water for the purposes of the reserved right while also protecting
existing water users and other interests. 33 9 To the extent that a wide
range of stakeholders had access to the negotiation process, and the
resulting agreement demonstrably addresses a wide range of interests,
this "great compromise" argument should be all the more
persuasive.3 ° Moreover, a federal court reviewing an agency decision
regarding the management and protection of resources overseen by
that agency would appear to owe at least some deference to that
decision.3 4' It is hard to saysay which is the proper level of deference for
an agency decision to settle a reserved right claim, 42 although sliding338. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
339. For example, in High Country Citizens' Alliance, the government argued
strongly that the 2003 agreements were "a creative solution to meeting multiple needs,"
and represented the best approach to protect the Aspinall Unit as well as the Black
Canyon, for water on the Gunnison River. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton,
448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (D. Colo. 2006).
340. The argument failed in High Country Citizens' Alliance, where the agreement
was the product of closed-door negotiations between the federal and state governments.
See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text. The court stated that it was not lear
who had participated in the settlement talks. High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.
Supp. 2d at 1241. However, the Colorado Supreme Court made a point of noting that
the environmental plaintiffs in the federal case "were not invited to participate in any
negotiations" leading up to the 2003 agreements. In reApplication for Water Rights of
the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Colo. 2004).
341. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-35 (2001), explains the Supreme
Court's approach to judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its governing
statute. In short, an agency's decision qualifies for strong judicial deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if
it appears that that Congress gave the agency authority to make binding law through
that type of decision, and that the agency exercised that authority on this occasion.
Mead,533 U.S. at 229, 234-35. An agency decision not qualifying for Chevron deference
may still receive a weaker form of deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944), whereby the degree of a court's deference depends on the overall
persuasiveness of the agency's decision in light of various factors. Mead, 533 U.S. at
227-28, 234-35.
342. A recent case involving a water allocation settlement decision by the Army Corps
of Engineers illustrates the challenge of determining the right form of deference. See,
e.g., Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The
States of Florida and Alabama challenged a settlement whereby the Corps allocated to
public water supply a certain percentage of the water stored in one of its reservoirs. Id.
at 1318. In determining whether the settlement violated any of the Corps' governing
statutes, the majority of the court of appeals stated that Chevron deference would apply,
never explaining why it was appropriate. Id. at 1321. A concurring opinion by Judge
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scale deference under Skidmore v. Swift 4" seems most appropriate.3'
One thing is clear however: no form of deference will save a settlement
if the court believes that the agency has clearly violated its governing
statutes,345 as in High Country CitizensAlliance.3"

Finally, even if the plaintiffs succeed in their APA challenge to a
reserved right settlement, they will have won an important battle, but
not the war. The court will not issue an order definitively establishing
the existence or elements of the reserved right; instead, the likely
remedy is a remand to the agency.3 7 Nothing prevents the agency from
reaching a new settlement agreement that is better supported than the
original, but is not more palatable to the plaintiffs. In fact, a simple
remand would leave the agency free to forsake the settlement process
entirely, and pursue confirmation of its reserved right claims through
the state adjudication-which may or may not be a good outcome for
the federal plaintiffs, depending upon their goals regarding the
Silberman, however, denied any deference to the agency because the settlement was
merely a litigating position. Id. at 1327. Judge Silberman also cited United States v.
Mead, however, a case indicating that at least Skidmore deference would be
appropriate. Id. The lack of clarity on this point in a decision by the D.C. Circuit-no
stranger to review of all manner of agency actions-shows the difficulty in resolving this
question of deference for litigation settlements.
343. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
344. Mead supports this conclusion. See supra note 341.- As the Court noted in that
case, the great majority of its decisions giving Chevron deference involve agency
decisions made through rulemaking or formal adjudication, Mead, 533 U.S. at 230,
neither of which is involved in reserved right settlements. In fact, reserved right
settlements do not arise from any federal administrative process, but from negotiations
conducted in connection with a state adjudication; thus, there is no agency proceeding
through which Congress intended the agency to have lawmaking authority. See supra
notes 269-69 and accompanying text; see Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30. Finally, like the
Customs rulings at issue in Mead, a reserved right settlement does not establish
precedent or apply beyond the right(s) involved that agreement, id. at 233, meaning
that the agency's decision is not intended to make generally applicable law. Even if
Chevron does not apply, however, Mead indicates that a reviewing court generally
should consider whether to accord deference to the agency's decision under Skidmore.
Id, at 234-235. Given the variable nature of Skidmore deference, it is difficult to say how
much weight a court might give to any particular settlement decision.
345. Southeastern FederalPower Customers,Inc., illustrates this point well. In that
D.C. Circuit case involving a Corps of Engineers water allocation settlement, the
majority and concurring opinions disagreed not only about the level of deference to
give the settlement, see supra note 342, but also about the proper baseline for
evaluating the effect of the proposed allocation. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc., 514
F.3d at 1324, 1327. Despite these differences, all three judges had little trouble
agreeing that the settlement violated the statute, 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d), prohibiting the
Corps from making major operational changes at a project without first obtaining
Congressional approval. Id. at 1324-25, 1327-28.
346. See supra notes 168-204 and accompanying text. The opinion in High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, essentially gave Skidmore deference to the settlement
decision, stating that in evaluating the agencies' "informal interpretation of the statutes
governing the administration of the Black Canyon, this Court must consider the agency
interpretation to the extent that the interpretation is well reasoned and has a power to
persuade." High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1251 (D.
Colo.2006).
347. See, e.g., High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (remanding
the Black Canyon reserved right matter to the agency "for further proceedings
consistent with this decision").
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reserved right.
This last point raises the issue of the potential impacts of federal
judicial review on future efforts to settle reserved water rights. These
settlement implications are the subject of the next subsection.
B. EFFECTS OF REVIEWABILITY ON SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Because negotiated settlement has become the preferred approach
to resolving reserved right claims, 48 federal judicial review of such
settlements may have significant practical impacts on the future
determination of federal claims. Given that every reserved right claim
presents a unique situation, it is impossible to predict how the potential
for federal review might affect any given one of them. Each claim has
its own legal strengths and weaknesses, its own perceived costs and
benefits for local and state residents, and its own array of opponents
and supporters; 9 these site-specific and right-specific circumstances will
determine how the possibility of federal review might influence any
particular settlement effort. That caveat will prove more universally
true than any of the following general observations on the implications
of reviewability for settlements.
The most immediate effect of potential federal review should be an
infusion of influence for those entities that lack water rights, but are
interested in the reserved water right at issue, such as environmental
groups, water-dependent business owners such as rafting companies,
and recreators such as anglers or birders. Despite their strong interest
"in maintaining adequate water for their preferred uses, such entities
have typically been either foreclosed from participating in state
adjudications or prevented from raising issues that could have helped
their cause.350 Unlike the water right holders involved in the
adjudication, many such entities may support the federal claim and seek
to have it quantified at a relatively high level, although that is not
necessarily true. 5'

Because they have had little or no power to affect

state adjudications, such entities may have held little or no sway over
reserved right negotiations in the past. As potential plaintiffs in a
federal court challenge to a settlement, however, they are far more
likely to be taken seriously, and they may even gain a seat at the
negotiating table.

348. See supranotes 58-63 and accompanying text.
349. See Amman et al., supra note 61, at 44 (describing successful settlement of
various National Park Service reserved right claims in Montana, and explaining how
settlement of a claim was affected by legal issues, local economic and political factors,
and potential effects of the right on existing and future uses of water).
350. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text; see also Idaho Conservation
League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 749-50 (Idaho 1995) (affirming that the public trust
doctrine applies to Idaho water rights, but is not an issue to be considered in an
adjudication).
351. It is not hard to imagine a group of citizens that would lack water rights but
oppose a federal reserved right because of how it might affect them; for example, a
group of landowners downstream of the federal reservation could be concerned that
high flows might result in flooding of their property.
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The prospect of federal judicial review may also strengthen the
negotiating position of those who support recognition and adequate
quantification of the subject reserved right. Opponents of the reserved
right have always had an advantage in negotiations because if talks
failed, the right would be adjudicated solely in state court, 35 2 where
federal reserved right claims have often fared poorly.2 Given the
354
choice between a weak settlement and a politically adverse state court,
the federal negotiators may choose the settlement despite its terms;
whatever else may be said about the settlement, it offers a predictable
outcome and an ability to publically declare a positive result. If a
federal court can review the settlement for its consistency with federal
law, however, the government (and others who support the claim)
should have a stronger basis for insisting that the settlement be
demonstrably adequate for protecting the purposes of the federal
reservation.
If these effects come to pass-that is, if the prospect of federal
review of settlements increases the influence of those lacking water
rights, and strengthens the negotiating position of those supporting. the
federal claim-the result should be better balanced and more durable
settlements. A final resolution of water rights that is manifestly
inequitable or that fails effectively to protect important public values in
the water resource, will not necessarily provide long-term certainty and
stability.355 An agreement that leaves a strongly interested group
352. A state court adjudication decision regarding a reserved right is subject to
federal review only in the unlikely event that the Supreme Court agrees to take the case.
See supa notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
353. See Janet C. Neuman & Michael C. Blumm, Water for NationalForests: The
Bypass low Report and the GreatDivide in Western Water Law, 18 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 3,
9-11 (1999) (describing Colorado courts' rejection of instream flow claims for national
forest lands); see also Blumm, supra note 32, at 177 (explaining and analyzing the
Idaho Supreme Court's rejection of reserved water rights for instream flows, especially
for wilderness areas).
354. State water politics arguably resulted in an Idaho Supreme Court decision
denying a federal reserved right claim, and in the re-election defeat of an Idaho
Supreme Court justice who originally cast the deciding vote in favor of recognizing the
federal right. See Blumm, supra note 32, at 178-210. Blumm concludes that the Idaho
decision will be remembered for the point "that political expediency is always a factor in
decisions of state court judges who are subject to reelection." Id. at 226. In another
article, Colorado Supreme Court Justice (and water law expert) Gregory Hobbs draws
parallels between the Idaho judicial election and an earlier one where a Colorado
Supreme Court justice had been defeated for voting in favor of the federal government
in a water rights case. Judge Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an
IndependentJudiciary:The ColoradoandIdaho Experiences,5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
122,123 (2001).
355. The Carson-Truckee basin of Nevada may provide the best example of a "final"
water rights decision yielding ongoing controversy and instability. The U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Nevada v. United Staes, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) barred the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe from obtaining reserved water rights to restore the Pyramid Lake
fishery, seemingly blocking the Tribe from obtaining additional water for this purpose.
Michael C. Blumm, David H. Becker, & Joshua D. Smith, The Mirage of Indian
Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran
Amendment Era: A Promise Unfuldiled, 36 ENvTL. L. 1157, 1191 (2006). "Despite this
apparently crushing setback, over the past twenty years the tribe has successfully used
Nevada state water law, water quality litigation, and pressure based on the [Endangered
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unsatisfied and determined to undo the deal is likely to face ongoing
turbulence.3 5 6 As Professor Cosens notes, "The fairness of the
negotiation process requires attention to inclusion of a widening circle
of interests. People with direct interests in water must be represented at
the table .... Durability of the outcome requires that the process and
solution be comprehensive by including all interests and all relevant

issues. ,,37
Obviously, not everyone would regard these potential developments
as positive, and this fact raises one further possible effect of federal
review: discouraging some parties from pursuing settlement at all.
Western states and traditional water users, in particular, may decide that
they would sooner litigate federal claims in state court than pursue
multi-party negotiations that could result in a federal court case.3 58 The
prospect of bigger, more complex negotiations that would presumably
be longer, and more difficult, may also cause some parties to question
the settlement path. Thus, subjecting settlements to federal judicial
review seems likely to result in litigation of some federal claims that
otherwise might have settled.35
Counterbalancing these concerns,
Species Act listings of Pyramid Lake fish species] to secure additional instream flows in
the Truckee River and into Pyramid Lake." Id. Congress also passed a statute in 1990
that helped the Tribe make progress toward its restoration goals. Id, at 1192, (citing
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101618, tit. II, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990)).
356. For example, the Animas-La Plata Project, a proposed reservoir in southwestern
Colorado, was included in a 1988 tribal water rights settlement. Thorson, supra note
10, at 461. "An excruciating five years followed, in which A-LP was downsized and
reconfigured. Groups not involved in the original negotiations, environmentalists and
the Navajo Nation, proved to be formidable opponents as their previously left out or
discounted interests had to be taken into account by project developers." Id. at 462.
According to the authors of a study on adjudications, the Animas-La Plata story shows
that "if a settlement does not include all affected parties, there may be impacts on the
non-represented parties. Unrepresented parties give rise to due process concerns, and
those parties may challenge the legitimacy of such settlements." Id. at 479.
357. Barbara Cosens, Water Dispute Resolution in the West: ProcessElements for the
Modern Era in Basin-Wide Problem Solving, 33 ENVrL. L. 949, 1017-18 (2003). "People
with an interest in the effect of water use on the basin community must also have an
opportunity for comment at a time in the negotiation process when solutions are still in
the design phase." Id. at 1017.
358. Even without the prospect of federal review, some opponents of reserved rights
would rather take their chances in state court than agree to recognize federal claims.
See Steven W. Strack, Pandora'sBox or Golden Opportunity? Using the Settlement of
Indian Reserved Water Right Claims to Affirn State Sovereignty Over Idaho Water and
Promote IntergovernmentalCooperation,42 IDAHO L. REv. 633, 636 (2006) (describing
the State of Idaho's rationale for settling tribal reserved right claims after those claims
had been rejected by the Idaho adjudication court). The court made its decision in
response to "critics of the settlement [who] argue that the settlement agreement cedes
too much to the Tribe." Id. at 650. The court also noted that some people "asserted that
the State had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory." Id. at 670.
359. While it is reasonable to expect that some federal claims will not settle because
of the prospect of federal court review, it is impossible to say whether litigating those
claims would produce better or worse results (as compared to settlement) from the
standpoint of the federal government and its allies. As noted earlier, settlements have
routinely subordinated the reserved right to all established uses of water. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text. Subordination is a major concession that protects
existing water users at the expense of federal interests. Even a modern-day water right,
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however, are powerful reasons why negotiation is superior to litigation
as a means for resolving water disputes,36 including the uncertainty of
litigation outcomes,"' the high cost of litigation for all parties involved,
and the flexibility of settlements in addressing each party's key
concerns. Thus, while the prospect of federal review of settlements may
make negotiations less attractive for some, and may well make
agreements harder to reach, it seems likely that settlements will remain
the preferred approach for resolving reserved right claims.362
36 3
The Black Canyon story, although unusual in one key respect,
illustrates how federal judicial review might play out in future efforts to
settle federal reserved rights. The 2003 agreements, produced through
closed-door negotiations among government officials, were challenged
in federal court;364 the plaintiffs were environmental groups who had

not been included in the settlement process, and who saw the
agreements as giving away water needed by the park.3 65 The federal
court closely reviewed the government's decision for compliance with
federal law, determined that the government violated the law, and
invalidated a locally popular settlement-all without fear of political

however, ordinarily should provide better protection than no water right at all, which is
what the United States might obtain if a state court litigates its claims. See supra notes
354-55 and accompanying text. The extent to which a subordinated right is actually
better than nothing depends on various site-specific factors, including the practical
likelihood of increasing water demands that would reduce flows to the federal lands,
and the chances that such demands would actually obtain all state and federal approvals
needed to allow for the new or increased water use. Thus, even assuming a worst-case
legal scenario where a federal claim is forced into litigation and entirely denied by a
state court, it is impossible to say whether the foregone settlement would be much of a
loss in practical terms.
360. Cosens summarizes these reasons as "(1) the inadequacy of litigation for
resolution of resource allocation problems, (2) ability to use the factual complexity of
water supply and demand to expand availability and protection of the water resource,
and (3) the need for participation by a broader range of interests." Cosens, supra note
357, at 962; see generally Barbara Cosens, 2005 Indian Water Rights Settlement
Conference Keyote Address, 9 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 285, 286 (2006) (describing
reasons why settlements are superior in tribal reserved rights context).
361. See generallyBarbara Cosens, Truth or Consequences. Settling Water Disputes
in the Face of Uncertainty, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 717 (2006) (providing a thorough
examination of the effect of legal (and scientific) uncertainty on settlement of certain
water right claims of the Nez Perce tribe).
362. After noting a trend toward settlement of reserved right claims for non-Indian
federal lands, the authors of a water law text wrote:
As court decisions provide a better fix on the contours of these rights, federal agencies
assemble the information necessary to quantify them, states discover what little threat
many of these rights pose to state water right holders, and all continue to suffer from
the expense and length of adjudications, the settlement fever is likely to spread. SAX,
supra note 60at 815.
363. That one respect is the 1978 partial decree that determined the existence,
purposes, and priority date of the Black Canyon reserved right, leaving quantification as
the only issue. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. Without that earlier
decree the parties would have had more issues to negotiate (or litigate), perhaps
making settlement less likely.
364.. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241-43 (D.
Colo. 2006).
365. Id.at 1235, 1242-43.
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repercussions. 366 The parties did not resort to litigation in response to
this decision, but instead engaged in negotiations involving a wide
range of groups interested in the Black Canyon water right.3 6v These
talks produced a new settlement agreement that all parties could live
with and that resulted in an uncontested decree, thus finalizing a
reserved right that had been pending in the water court for more than
three decades.368 Thus, in the Black Canyon context, federal judicial
review of the original agreement led to a better process and a better
result.
CONCLUSION
The Black Canyon experience suggests that federal review of
settlements may offer real benefits for the successful negotiation and
resolution of reserved water rights. While the Black Canyon provides a
useful case study, however, the argument for federal judicial review of
reserved right settlements ultimately comes down to good government.
In other words, review of settlements can help address some
fundamental design flaws in the way that the executive and judicial
branches handle federal reserved water rights.
Federal judicial review provides the only real check on a federal
agency's ability to essentially give up reserved rights through settlement,
to the benefit of private water users and the detriment of the public.
This kind of federal action has not traditionally been the greatest policy
concern with respect to reserved rights; western states and water users
have feared just the opposite, an imperious federal government that
would attempt to nationalize water resources at the expense of state
control. 369 The Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado River and
United States v. New Mexico, giving state courts control over reserved
right litigation and prescribing a narrow legal standard for determining
reserved rights, 3v0 provided a powerful and demonstrably effective check
against federal overreaching. Federal judicial review provides the only
corresponding check on federal "underreaching," or giveaway of water
associated with unquantified reserved rights-as the plaintiffs alleged
(and the court effectively agreed) took place with the 2003 Black
Canyon agreements. 371 One can argue that the 2003 agreements were
not in fact a giveaway, or that federal agencies are very unlikely to
"underreach" in settling their reserved rights, but it is difficult to
366. Id. at 1250-53. Judge Brimmer was uniquely unconcerned with Colorado water
politics, unlike a state judge who might fear the electoral consequences of voting the
wrong way in a major water case. See supra note 354. Not only was Judge Brimmer an
Article III judge with a lifetime appointment, but he was also a District of Wyoming
judge sitting by designation in Colorado. Judgepedia.org, Clarence Brimmer, available
at http://judgepedia.org/index.php/ClarenceBrimmer (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
367. Jaffe, supra note 222.
368. See id.
369. See Thorson, supranote 10, at 310, 323.
370. See supranotes 294-98 and accompanying text.
371. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1252-53
(D. Colo. 2006.
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maintain that anything would effectively prevent the government from
doing so in the absence of federal judicial review of settlements.
A more basic problem, however, is reliance on courts as the
exclusive forum for making long-term decisions about water issues of
great public interest and importance. Water is a public resource, both
by nature and, in the western states at least, by law.372 Because the
western states have established proprietary rights to use water, however,
this public resource is largely viewed and managed as private
property;3 73 this tendency is strongest in the context of state
adjudications, where the courts have sometimes acknowledged the
public aspects of water but held them to be irrelevant to the
determination of previously established water rights.

374

This exclusion

of public interest factors is particularly inappropriate for federal
Winters claims, which are about as public as water rights can get, in that
they involve water for public lands designated by the government for
public purposes such as national parks and forests.3 75 To the extent that
state adjudications prevent effective participation by those who have an
interest in water but no proprietary rights to it,
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they effectively

discriminate in favor of established water users, as though the only
important consideration for reserved right claims were their potential
impacts on private rights. Closed-door negotiations involving only
government actors may lack this members-only favoritism, but they too
deny the interested public a meaningful opportunity to influence
decisions on reserved rights that have major public importance.
Providing federal review of reserved right settlements obviously will
not directly solve this 'judicial forum" problem. If it merely shifts the
action temporarily from state to federal court, it will perpetuate the
problem; if it forces more reserved rights to be litigated in state
adjudications rather than settled, it will exacerbate it. Federal judicial
review can help move decision-making in the right direction, however,
by encouraging a more accessible and inclusive process for resolving
disputes over reserved rights. Specific recommendations for design and

372. This idea appears in some form in the constitutions and/or the water codes of
the western states that allocate water based on prior appropriation. See, e.g., IDAHO
CONST. art. XV, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (West 2009);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 537.110 (West 2009).

373. See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (reaffirming that
Colorado constitutional provision declaring water to be property of the public, subject
to appropriation, was primarily intended to establish appropriation doctrine and gave
no right to public access on Colorado waters).
374. See, e.g., Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993)
(holding that environmental factors cannot be considered in determining water rights
in adjudication); Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995)
(holding that the public trust doctrine applies in Idaho but cannot be considered in
adjudication of water rights). But see San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 972 P.2d 179,
199 (Ariz. 1999) (striking down statute attempting to prevent consideration of public
trust doctrine in adjudication, and stating that courts would have to decide whether
public trust doctrine was applicable on the facts).
375. High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1237-39.
376. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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BLACK CANYON

implementation are beyond the scope of this article,377 but at a
minimum, the process must be open to the full range of stakeholdersthose with water rights and those without-and their interests in the
waters at issue. Providing an opportunity for public comment during
the course of the negotiations would be one positive step. 378 A further
step would be to allow interested groups to participate directly in
reserved right negotiations, such as the multi-party talks that ultimately
settled the Black Canyon reserved right.3
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In the end, a judicial decree

will still be necessary to confirm the reserved water right; the question is
whether the process leading up to that decree properly takes account of
public interests and concerns relating to the right.
As the court stated in High Country Citizens' Alliance, "A decision
to enter into agreements which permanently give up a priority to a
resource which must be 'saved for all generations' must be made in
public view and not behind closed doors with the public's interest in
mind."38 The decision in that case led to a process in which more
people had a say in determining the reserved right for Black Canyon
National Park, resulting in a stronger agreement for the waters of the
Gunnison River. By recognizing a right to judicial review of agency
decisions to settle reserved rights, the federal courts may extend that
opportunity to more people and more waters in the West.

377. A fairly detailed set of recommendations for resolving basin-wide water disputes
(including but not limited to reserved rights) may be found in Cosens, supra note 357,
at 1007-18.
378. The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission provides
opportunities for public comment as it negotiates on federal and tribal claims, and may
seek revisions to an agreement in response to public comment. See Amman et al.,
supra note 61, at 41. Of course, public comment may favor or oppose recognition of a
particular reserved right. Id. (noting strong opposition to Yellowstone National Park
reserved rights by a local chapter of People for the West!, but "generally positive"
reaction to Glacier National Park reserved rights in the local area).
379. See supranotes 363-67 and accompanying text.
380. High Country Citizens' Alliance,448 F. Supp. 2d at1245-46.

